Militarized Management of Territorial Claims in the Americas, 1816-2001

Paul R. Hensel
Department of Political Science
Florida State University
Tallahassee, FL 32306-2230
(850) 644-7318
phensel@icow.org

Abstract: Systematic research on militarized conflict over territory has focused on militarized consequences, such as conflict severity or recurrence, while research on the management of territorial issues or on conflict management more generally has emphasized peaceful attempts to manage or settle claims. This paper compares the relative effectiveness of militarized and peaceful techniques for managing territorial issues, as well as analyzing the extent to which the context of recent armed conflict affects the prospects for peaceful techniques. Preliminary results indicate that militarized techniques are much less likely than peaceful techniques to resolve territorial claims, while having several distinct impacts on the effectiveness of peaceful settlement attempts. Peaceful settlement attempts begun with a legacy of recent militarized conflict -- particularly when this conflict produced fatalities -- are less likely to reach agreements than comparable attempts in different contexts, but the agreements that are produced are more likely to be carried out by both parties and to end the claim. The paper concludes with suggestions about future directions for the study of both peaceful and militarized attempts to manage territorial issues.

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The topic of territorial claims has increasingly received systematic empirical analysis in the past two decades. Recent studies have examined territorial and other issues in interstate wars (e.g., Holsti 1991), militarized disputes over territory (e.g., Hensel 1996; Senese 1996), and the management of territorial claims (Huth 1996; Hensel 2001). Other studies have examined conflict management patterns more generally, rather than focusing on attempts to manage a single issue (e.g., Wilkenfeld and Brecher 1984; Dixon 1996). This paper seeks to contribute to these emerging bodies of literature on territory and conflict management by integrating the study of militarized conflict and the peaceful management of territorial claims with a common theoretical framework. It then concludes by discussing potentially fruitful avenues for further research on territory/geography and conflict.

Research on Territorial Issues

Systematic research on territorial issues has taken several forms. One prominent approach has focused on militarized conflict over territory. Research in this strand began by identifying a set of militarized conflicts and attempting to determine the contentious issue(s) at stake in each one, on either a conflict-wide or individual-actor basis. For example, Holsti (1991) compiled a list of all wars since 1648 and then identified the issues involved for each participant in each war; territorial issues turned out to be the most common issue involved in these wars. Similar efforts have subsequently been made to study the issues involved in militarized disputes and in other lists of wars, although typically with less comprehensive categorizations of issues than the list of approximately thirty different issues studied by Holsti (see Hensel 2000).

Beyond the descriptive value of compiling lists of the most frequent issues in wars or other armed conflicts, some research in this area has attempted to use this distinction between issues to account for variation in conflict behavior. For example, several studies since the mid-1990s have compared militarized disputes over territorial issues with those over other issues. These studies have generally found that territorial-issue disputes were much more likely to reach high levels of escalation and to be followed by recurrent conflict between the same adversaries (e.g., Hensel 1996, 2000; Senese 1996; Vasquez and Henehan 2001).

A second approach to research on territory has gone beyond militarized conflict to the larger question of the political management of territory. A central belief in this approach is that militarized conflict is only one form of interaction over territorial issues, and that much can be learned by studying other forms of interaction as well. Systematic work in this area began with the collection of the Correlates of War (COW) project's Territorial Change data set, which attempted to catalog every exchange of territory between states (as well as new states' gaining of independence from existing states). This approach produced a number of journal articles and several books (e.g., Goertz and Diehl 1992; Kacowicz 1994), and produced a variety of interesting findings on (inter alia) conditions that increase the likelihood that a given territorial change will occur through the use

of organized political violence or will be followed by militarized conflict in its aftermath.

More recent work in this area has adopted a more ambitious goal than research on territorial changes, by attempting to identify every case of explicit contention over territory by two or more states. The two most prominent projects in this regard have been Paul Huth's (1996) data on territorial disputes from 1950-1990, which has subsequently been extended to 1919-1995 (Huth and Allee 2002) and the Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) project's data on territorial claims since 1816. Both data sets attempt to identify every case where two or more states explicitly disagree over the ownership of a specific piece of territory, which presumably includes every case that has led to militarized conflict (as in the earlier studies) but also includes a variety of cases that have not. These data sets can be used for a variety of research topics that could not be addressed with earlier work, such as studying the likelihood that states involved in a territorial claim will become involved in militarized conflict over the claim, or studying the variety of peaceful techniques for managing or settling territorial claims.

Beyond work on territorial issues specifically, there has been a variety of recent research on conflict management processes, but this research has treated militarized conflict as the problem being managed rather than as an alternative technique for managing contentious issues. For example, several scholars have recently studied the impact of conflict management on enduring rivalries (e.g., Bercovitch and Diehl 1997; Goertz and Regan 1997; Greig 2001). These studies have examined the impact of mediation or similar techniques on such dependent variables as the time until the next militarized dispute between two rivals or the severity level of the next militarized dispute relative to past confrontations. Other scholars have examined conflict management in international crises (e.g., Butterworth 1978; Haas 1983; Wilkenfeld and Brecher 1984; Dixon 1993, 1994, 1996). These studies have typically focused on the conditions under which conflict managers become involved in a given crisis, or on short-term measures of success like producing an agreement.

While each of these bodies of research has shown important development over time, they have also tended to remain analytically distinct. Research on militarized conflict has tended to focus on the frequency or severity of armed conflict, or on the recurrence of armed conflict in its aftermath; little attention has been paid to the consequences of militarized conflict for nonmilitarized dimensions of interstate relations. Similarly, research on the management of territorial claims or on conflict management more generally has typically focused on the effectiveness of peaceful techniques for conflict management; little attention has been paid to the comparison of militarized and peaceful techniques for managing or settling issues.[1] Such comparisons form the purpose of the present paper.

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[1] Hensel (2001) has begun moving in this direction, by examining the conditions under which both militarized and peaceful techniques are employed to manage territorial issues, but that article did not study the effectiveness of these different techniques. More recently, Hensel and Tures (2003) have examined the effectiveness of peaceful techniques, but like most previous research, they have not examined the effectiveness of militarized techniques.

Theoretical Development

This paper adopts the general theoretical approach presented by Hensel (2001). This issue-based approach suggests that "world politics can be conceptualized and studied as contention between states over issues using a variety of coercive or cooperative techniques" (Hensel 2001: 84). Under this approach, the study of any phenomenon in world politics begins with contention over one or more issues; like Hensel (2001), the present study focuses on territorial issues, which have received the bulk of the attention in the nascent scholarly literature on issues. This approach treats a variety of different types of interaction -- bilateral negotiations, third party diplomatic involvement, submission of issues to binding third party settlements, or militarized conflict -- as substitutable means to pursue issue-related ends. Rather than distinct phenomena that require separate analysis, then, militarized conflict and peaceful conflict management techniques are seen as comparable tools that can be chosen by leaders for the same purpose of pursuing issue-related goals.

If both militarized and peaceful settlement techniques are to be compared as substitutable tools, there must be common ways to measure the effectiveness of these different techniques. The concept of "effectiveness," of course, has many dimensions, some of which are only useful for certain types of claim management techniques. Hensel and Tures (2003) consider three different dimensions of effectiveness that are well suited for the evaluation of peaceful settlement attempts: whether or not a given settlement attempt produces a treaty or agreement, whether or not this agreement is carried out by the claimants, and whether or not this agreement actually ends contention over the territorial claim. Diplomatic negotiations might reasonably be considered more effective if they produce agreements or treaties than if they do not, and might be considered even more effective if they produce agreements that are ratified and carried out by the signatories or that end all contention over the disputed territory. Yet militarized conflict cannot be evaluated in the same terms, as conflicts themselves do not produce treaties or agreements that can be ratified and implemented -- and if a militarized confrontation is settled through an agreement, that settlement could be considered the product of one or more series of negotiations that occurred during or after the confrontation.

One important dimension of effectiveness can be used to compare peaceful and militarized techniques, though. One goal of any settlement attempt -- whether peaceful or militarized -- is to produce a final settlement of the issue under contention. Both peaceful and militarized settlement attempts can be compared by examining whether or not each attempt brings about the end of the claim. This dimension of effectiveness, resolving the disputed issue, has been addressed for peaceful settlement attempts, but not for militarized attempts. For example, Dixon (1996) finds that mediation and adjudication appear to be more successful than other conflict management techniques at promoting the peaceful settlement of disputed issues. Similarly, Hensel and Tures (2003) find that the binding legal techniques of arbitration and adjudication appear to be more effective than other peaceful techniques for resolving territorial claims.

Although the resolution of disputed issues through militarized action has not been

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addressed directly, research on recurrent militarized conflict and rivalry suggests that militarized conflict is unlikely to resolve issues with any great frequency. Hensel (1994, 1996, 1999), for example, finds that more than two-thirds of militarized disputes over territorial issues are followed by subsequent militarized conflict between the same adversaries. Moreover, these recurrent disputes typically involve the same issue, and often occur within a decade or less.

This tendency for recurrent conflict, particularly when territorial issues are at stake, suggests that territorial issues can be very difficult to resolve militarily. This conclusion does not seem very surprising, as there is no guarantee that military threats or actions will be able to achieve the desired goal of acquiring the claimed territory or of convincing the adversary to back down from its claims. Even if militarized action does achieve these goals initially, the resulting settlement would appear to be accepted by the losing state only to the extent that it considers itself unable to reverse the loss (whether by force or by diplomatic and/or legal pressure). Militarized conflict also carries the risk of worsening relations between the adversaries; it is difficult to imagine a situation in which military threats or -- even worse -- bloody clashes can improve relations or avoid intensifying feelings of tension, distrust, and hostility, regardless of whether the conflict produces a temporary settlement and the resentment that this might produce on the losing side.

In contrast, ceteris paribus, peaceful settlement techniques such as bilateral negotiations, mediation, or arbitration seem unlikely to have a similar effect of increasing tension, distrust, hostility, or resentment. If a territorial issue is resolved through bilateral negotiation between the claimants, then presumably both consider the agreement to be satisfactory, and it should be more likely to hold over time than a militarized settlement. Similarly, if a territorial issue is resolved through third party assistance -- particularly if this assistance takes the form of a legally binding award or decision, with the corresponding legal norms and diplomatic pressures from other actors -- the award should be more likely to be accepted and carried out than a settlement reached through unilateral military action. This discussion suggests the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: *Militarized conflict will be less likely than peaceful settlement techniques to end territorial claims.*

Even if militarized conflict is unable to settle an issue by itself, it may still have an impact on the settlement of the issue. As noted above, a history of militarized conflict might be expected to worsen the relationship between two claimants, likely increasing tension and hostility between the adversaries, as well as increasing the sense that the adversary is not interested in a peaceful solution and cannot be trusted. Such consequences, ceteris paribus, should generally worsen the prospects for other attempts to manage the issue peacefully once the claimants have begun turning to militarized conflict in pursuit of their goals. As a result, it appears reasonable to expect that peaceful settlement attempts occurring after militarized conflict should be less successful initially, with regard to reaching agreements over the issues under contention; leaders may be unwilling to reach an agreement with a hated rival, and they may encounter significant domestic opposition to

any such agreement.

This negative impact of militarized conflict should be even stronger for more severe conflicts that produce fatalities among the disputants. It is one thing to threaten military force or to build up one's forces along the border for the purposes of coercive diplomacy; such actions seem unlikely to produce a major long-term reaction among either leaders or the domestic audience in the target state. If a confrontation leads to fatalities on one or both sides, though, it would seem likely to be transformed into something much more menacing and with a much longer-term effect. The spilling of blood appears to be an important threshold that draws the attention of domestic political audiences who otherwise pay little attention to foreign policy, and that creates pressures on leaders to ensure that their countrymen's blood was not shed in vain.

This suggests the following initial hypothesis on the militarized context and the peaceful management of territorial claims:

Hypothesis 2: *Peaceful settlement attempts begun in the aftermath of at least one recent militarized dispute will be less successful initially than those occurring outside of such a militarized context, particularly when that militarized conflict produced fatalities.*

Hypothesis 2 does not tell the whole story, though. While militarized conflict generally appears likely to worsen the prospects for a peaceful settlement of the underlying issues, it is also possible that militarized disputes could promote the peaceful settlement of the disputed issue(s) under certain conditions. That could happen if the states' leaders began to fear further escalation of the issue, and sought to resolve it before matters got out of hand.[2] Even if both sides' leaders share this motivation of seeking to avoid further escalation, though, any attempts to resolve the issue are likely to run into the same troubles mentioned above; even the risk of war can have a hard time overcoming entrenched hatred and distrust of the adversary.

The difficulty in discussing this alternative hypothesis about a possible pacifying effect of armed conflict lies in specifying the conditions under which past conflict can decrease the risk of a successful settlement, and the conditions under which past conflict can have the opposite effect. A potential solution lies in conceptualizing the effectiveness of a settlement attempt. As discussed above, a variety of different dimensions of settlement attempt effectiveness might be considered, each with its own advantages and disadvantages. With regard to the impact of recent militarized conflict, a reasonable solution to this difficulty is to expect a history of conflict to decrease the effectiveness of peaceful settlement attempts along one or more dimensions, while perhaps increasing effectiveness along different dimensions.

Specifically, as suggested above, it should be much more difficult to reach an agreement that both sides consider acceptable when there is a history of recent armed conflict between them than

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[2] This argument resembles the widely known "war weariness" effect, under which the experience of a full-scale war is expected to decrease the involved states' subsequent war involvement. While the war weariness argument appears plausible, though, there is little empirical evidence of a systematic war weariness phenomenon (e.g., Garnham 1986; Levy and Morgan 1986).

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when there is a history of peaceful relations. If an agreement can be reached in such a context, though, the fear of further escalation of the issue may be enough to convince the leaders (and perhaps their constituents) to take advantage of the opportunity for a settlement. If this is true, we should expect leaders to be more willing to carry out the terms of the agreement, and peaceful settlement attempts should be more successful in the longer-term dimensions of effectiveness.

This situation is similar to the concept of "ripeness" that appears frequently in the literature on conflict management (Zartman 1985, 2000; Kleiboer 1994; Greig 2001). Kriesberg (2003: 260), for example, suggests that effective mediation is much more difficult when the adversaries' conflict has been more intense and destructive. Two countries with no history of militarized conflict would thus seem to have few barriers to a peaceful settlement of any contentious issues that may arise between them, but those with a lengthy or destructive conflict history should experience great difficulties in settling their issues peacefully.[3] At some point, though, the costs and risks of armed conflict are likely to become great enough that the conflict should become "ripe" for settlement. Kriesberg (1992: 145) suggests that agreement is most likely "in the existence of a mutually hurtful or unacceptable condition that neither side believes it can improve unilaterally." To the extent that a history of recent militarized conflict produces such "ripeness," the adversaries should be expected to be able to carry out agreements that are reached because of the alternative of continued and perhaps escalated conflict, even if it remains difficult to settle the underlying issue(s) with a hated enemy.

Hypothesis 3: *If peaceful settlement attempts occurring in the aftermath of recent militarized conflict can produce an agreement over the underlying issue, this agreement is likely to be more successful than agreements occurring outside of such a militarized context, particularly when that militarized conflict produced fatalities.*

Research Design

This paper's hypotheses are examined using data collected or extended by the ICOW project. The spatial-temporal domain of this study is the set of all qualifying claims to territory in the Western Hemisphere from 1816-2001. This spatial limitation is necessary because of the current status of the ICOW territorial claims data set, although several additional regions are approaching completion. It should be noted that the key spatial determination is whether the claimed territory is located in the Western Hemisphere, rather than whether the claimants themselves are located in that region; many claims involve one or even two European claimants seeking to maintain or extend their colonial possessions. This time frame reflects the current status of all three data sets that are used in this study's analyses: the Correlates of War (COW) Militarized Interstate Dispute data set, the ICOW territorial claims data set, and the Polity 4 data

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[3] On the other hand, Zartman (1997: 16) suggests that situations with little threat of armed violence might be unlikely to produce effective settlements: "Conflicts that cost little have little reason for settlement; they just simmer along, waiting for the moment when they can boil over."

set.[4]

Territorial Claims

The ICOW territorial claims data set is described by Hensel (2001), and the latest list of territorial claims in the Americas is provided in Table 1. Briefly, there are three requirements to qualify as a territorial claim: there must be explicit statements demanding permanent sovereignty over territory, these statements must be made by official government representatives who are authorized to make foreign policy, and the statements must address a specific piece of territory. A total of 75 claims to territory in the Western Hemisphere meet this definition; many of these claims involve several different dyadic claim components (under which several different actors contend over the territory, or the same actors end a claim only to see it restarted later).

[Table 1 about here]

Much of the literature on territorial claims has employed the concept of salience, or the importance of the claimed territory to the actors. The ICOW project has created a measure of salience that incorporates six indicators of attributes that increase the value of territory, with each indicator contributing one point to the salience index for each claimant that qualifies (thus producing a scale from 0-12). The six indicators are measures of whether the claimed territory is known or believed to contain valuable economic resources, a strategic location, ethnic or religious ties to one or both claimants, and a permanent population, as well as whether the territory is claimed as the actor's homeland or as a dependency and whether it is located on the mainland or offshore (for more details see Hensel 2001). Where necessary, this twelve-point index is used to generate three salience categories: high salience, indicating that each side has numerous reasons to value the territory (salience scores of 8-12); moderate salience (scores of 5-7); and low salience, indicating that neither side attaches much value to the territory (scores of 0-4).

Peaceful and Militarized Settlement Attempts

The ICOW data set on territorial claims includes data on each attempt to settle each claim peacefully through a variety of different techniques. Bilateral negotiations refer to direct talks between the claimants themselves, with no third party participation. Non-binding third party activities include good offices, inquiry or conciliation, mediation, and multilateral negotiations (where the third party participates as an interested party rather than as a conflict manager). Binding third party activities include arbitration and adjudication. Data collection on each settlement attempt addresses the timing, third party participants if any, and effectiveness (as discussed below) of the attempt, as well as the contents of the negotiations and of any agreement that is reached (for more detail see Hensel 2001; Hensel and Tures 2003).

Militarized conflict is a somewhat trickier matter. Rather than collect an entirely new data set on militarized confrontations during territorial claims, the ICOW project begins with the COW

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[4] All three data sets have recently been extended through the end of 2001. The MID3 project released its update of the MID data set to cover 1816-2001 in April 2003, followed by the Polity 4 data set's update to 1816-2001, and the ICOW territorial claims data set has just been updated through the end of 2001 for this conference.

militarized interstate dispute data set (Jones et al. 1996), which is used to identify potential militarized disputes over territory [5] in order to determine whether each dispute produced any dispute-related fatalities.[6] Each militarized dispute occurring during an ongoing territorial claim is examined using the codesheets constructed for the territorial claims data set, the MID names file where relevant, and general reference sources such as the New York Times and Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe where possible. Each dispute that is determined to involve territorial issues between these two claimants is then coded as being a part of the appropriate claim. In order to qualify, the dispute must represent an attempt by one or both claimants to pursue the territorial claim -- such as attempting to occupy the territory, consolidate an existing hold on the territory, or defend it against the adversary; numerous disputes between claimants do not qualify because they concerned other, non-territorial issues.

It should be noted that the resulting codes do not match up perfectly with the original COW codings as presented in the MID 2.10 data set, for several reasons. Several militarized disputes that were not originally coded as involving territorial issues -- often because of insufficient information in the sources consulted by the COW coders -- are now identified as being territorial, as new information reveals that the disputes were directly related to territorial claims. Several other disputes that were coded as involving territorial issues are not coded as such in the ICOW version of the data set, typically because they involve maritime questions rather than sovereignty over dry land (or islands), or else because the dyads in question were not contending directly over territory (e.g., most participants in World War II did not have territorial claims with Germany, Japan, or Italy, although the overall dispute is coded as territorial because of those countries that did, and many third parties that joined ongoing disputes over territory did not have direct territorial claims involved in the conflict).

This detailed analysis and assignment of militarized disputes to specific territorial claims represents an improvement over the approach used in past research. Until each dispute could be analyzed to determine which (if any) territorial claim was involved, disputes had to be assigned by assumption. For example, disputes could have been assumed to involve every ongoing territorial claim between the disputants, or else they had to be assigned on the basis of the relevant claims' starting dates or other similar factors. It is now known specifically which militarized disputes were associated with which territorial claims, so while the descriptive statistics to be presented in Table 1 will differ slightly from those presented by Hensel (2001), we may be confident that these results are more accurate with respect to the number of militarized disputes per claim.

Table 2 provides a descriptive examination of the connection between territorial claims and

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[5] Each dispute is broken down dyadically, by pairing each actor on side A of the dispute with each actor on side B. Not every possible dyadic pairing engaged in militarized interaction with each other during multilateral disputes, though, so some potential dyadic disputes are thrown out; examples include dyadic pairings in which the two states were never on opposite sides of the dispute at the same time or in which neither side undertook any military action (i.e., each was only in the dispute as the target of some other state's actions).

[6] The MID data only codes dispute-related fatalities among the disputants' regular forces. Civilian fatalities are excluded, as are military fatalities that result from disease, accidents, or similar causes

militarized conflict. The first portion of this table examines the proportion of claims producing at least one militarized dispute, based on the salience of the claimed territory. Over half of all claims have led to at least one confrontation, with the total increasing from 48.0 percent of all low-salience claims to 51.7 percent of all moderate-salience claims and a full 90.5 percent of high-salience claims. This increase is statistically significant (X^2 = 10.52, 2 d.f., p < .01) and indicates that higher claim salience generally increases the risk of militarized conflict; it is instructive that only two of the 21 high-salience claims were able to avoid conflict.

[Table 2 about here]

The second portion of Table 2 goes into more detail on the average number of militarized and peaceful settlement attempts in each claim. High-salience claims produce many more militarized disputes on average than their lower-salience counterparts, with three to five times as many disputes per claim; this effect is statistically significant (F = 7.71, 2 d.f., p < .001). Despite their prominence in news headlines, though, militarized disputes represent only a small fraction of all attempts to settle the claim. Low-salience claims average 1.4 militarized disputes but 3.4 peaceful settlement attempts; the disparity is even greater for claims of moderate and high salience. Although militarized conflict generally makes more headlines and has been the subject of most previous research on territorial claims, on average militarized disputes only account for about one-fifth of all attempts to settle territorial claims (with 2.3 militarized disputes and 9.5 peaceful attempts in the typical claim).

Effectiveness of Settlement Attempts

As discussed briefly in developing the hypotheses, above, the "effectiveness" of settlement attempts can be conceptualized and measured in many different ways. Three specific measures of the effectiveness of each attempt are used (for more detail see Hensel and Tures 2003 and the ICOW territorial claims data set codebook). The first measure to be used indicates whether or not the settlement attempt produced a treaty or agreement. The second measure indicates whether or not the settlement attempt produced a treaty or agreement that was carried out by both claimants, a somewhat stricter measure of effectiveness. The third measure, stricter yet, indicates whether or not the settlement attempt in question ended most or all of the underlying territorial claim.

The first two of these measures can only be used to measure the effectiveness of peaceful settlement attempts, as militarized conflict does not involve a treaty or agreement that can be ratified or carried out (although the militarized conflict may lead to one or more peaceful settlement attempts that produce such an agreement). The test of Hypothesis 1, regarding the relative effectiveness of militarized and peaceful settlement attempts, focuses on the third of these dimensions. The tests of Hypotheses 2 and 3, though, consider all three dimensions.

Control Variables

Although some of this paper's analyses will be bivariate in nature, multivariate analyses will also be employed to control for the possible effects of several other factors that are likely to be

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related. Where relevant, the different types of settlement attempts will be distinguished through the use of dummy variables, leaving bilateral negotiations out of the equation as the referent value. Two additional control variables will also be employed: the salience of the claimed territory (as described above), and dyadic democracy.

Claim salience will be measured in these multivariate analyses through the full zero-to-twelve point index rather than through dummy variables for the categories of low, moderate, and high salience. The expectation is that settlement attempts of any type will be less effective when the claim in question has higher salience, as neither side will be willing to part with a potentially valuable territory. Political democracy is measured for each state by the Polity 4 data set's "Polity 2" variable, which subtracts each state's measure of autocratic characteristics from its measure of democratic characteristics and adjusts for times of polity interruption, interregnum, or transition (see the Polity 4 codebook for more details). These state-level polity scores are combined into a dyadic measure using the "weakest link" approach, taking the lower of the two scores to reflect the least democratic state in the dyad (Dixon 1993, 1994). The expectation is that settlement attempts in more democratic dyads will be more effective, ceteris paribus, drawing from a variety of research that suggests democracies are more willing and able to use peaceful means to resolve their conflicts than are other types of adversaries.

Empirical Analyses

The first hypothesis suggested that militarized conflict will generally be less successful as a settlement technique than will peaceful techniques. Table 3 examines the relative effectiveness of militarized and peaceful settlement attempts, in order to test this hypothesis. A militarized dispute is coded as ending a claim if it led to the challenger state's ability to achieve its goal (through physical capture of the territory or through a coerced agreement by the target to cede the territory) or if it led the challenger state to abandon its claim. A peaceful settlement attempt is coded as ending a claim if it led to a negotiated or awarded division of the territory, to one side's acquisition of the territory, or to the challenger's dropping of explicit claims to the territory.[7] This table excludes all peaceful settlement attempts that did not involve sovereignty over part or all of the claimed territory, as neither functional nor procedural talks can be expected to end a claim; similarly, it excludes all militarized disputes that did not involve clear territorial issues related to an ICOW territorial claim

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[7] A peaceful settlement attempt is coded as ending the claim if it leads to the end of contention over most or all of the claimed territory. In a few cases, a treaty or an arbitral award resolved the majority of the claim, while leaving a small portion of the territory uncertain; in these cases it made much more sense to consider the attempt successful despite the small omission than to consider it unsuccessful despite resolving almost everything. Also, either a peaceful or militarized settlement can be coded as ending a claim, despite the rapid emergence of a new claim. Claim termination is coded based on the specific claim raised by the challenger state in a claim, so a claim is considered to have ended if the challenger achieves it goals or otherwise drops the claim, even if the challenger achieving its goals soon leads to the emergence of a new claim with the losing side emerging as a new challenger.

as listed in Table 1.[8]

[Table 3 about here]

As hypothesized, militarized disputes are much less successful at ending claims than are any of the three categories of peaceful settlement techniques. Over two-thirds of all binding third party activities -- arbitration and adjudication -- end the territorial claim within two years (71.4 percent of the time). Slightly under one-fifth of bilateral negotiations (19.5 percent) and non-binding third party activities (15.6 percent) ended the claim in question, as did barely one-twentieth of all militarized disputes over territorial issues. (5.7 percent). This result is highly statistically significant (X^2 = 86.93, 3 d.f., p < .001), indicating a systematic difference between the four categories of settlement attempts.

These bivariate results in Table 3 are instructive, but a more convincing answer depends on a multivariate analysis that can control for additional factors. Table 4 presents a logit analysis of settlement attempt effectiveness, controlling for the salience of the claimed territory and for dyadic democracy. The results are quite consistent with the bivariate results from Table 3, with militarized disputes being significantly less successful at ending claims than the referent category of bivariate negotiations, and with fatal militarized disputes binding third party activities being significantly more successful than the other types at ending claims; there is no systematic difference between non-binding third party activities and bilateral negotiations. Additionally, as expected, greater claim salience significantly reduces the effectiveness of settlement attempts, while dyadic democracy has little systematic impact in this analysis.

[Table 4 about here]

Together, the results presented in Tables 3 and 4 suggest strong support for Hypothesis 1, as militarized disputes are much less effective than the other settlement attempts at ending explicit contention over territory. This is consistent with past research indicating that militarized disputes over territorial issues are more likely to be followed by recurrent militarized conflict, although this study's evidence is based on a different population of cases than previous research on recurrent conflict. These analyses alone do not tell the entire story, though; few settlement attempts (whether peaceful or militarized) occur in a political vacuum. The remaining analyses attempt to extend beyond these first tables by examining the impact of militarized disputes on subsequent peaceful settlement attempts.

[Table 5 about here]

Tables 5 and 6 are meant to test Hypotheses 2 and 3, which suggested that peaceful settlement attempts should initially be less successful after recent militarized disputes over territory, but that any agreements that are reached in such a context should be more successful. Three different measures of effectiveness are examined -- reaching agreements, carrying out agreements

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[8] Procedural attempts involve "talks about talks," typically laying the groundwork for further talks in the future or agreeing on terms for submission of a case to third party arbitration or adjudication. Functional attempts involve the use of the claimed territory, although avoiding the sovereignty question; examples include agreements to demilitarized disputed territory, to allow free navigation along a disputed border river, or to remove barriers to trade along a disputed border.

that are reached, and ultimately ending contention over the issue under agreements that are reached. Regarding Hypothesis 2 on reaching agreements, a context of recent militarized conflict significantly decreases the probability that a given settlement attempt will produce a treaty or agreement, whether considering all militarized disputes over territory ($X^2 = 5.06$, 1 d.f., p < .03) or only those disputes that produced fatalities ($X^2 = 7.39$, 1 d.f., p < .01). This is consistent with the main substance of the hypothesis, although there is no real difference between disputes with and without fatalities.

The middle section of the table examines only those cases where an agreement was reached, in order to determine the effectiveness of the agreements themselves; the bottom section further restricts analysis to agreements involving sovereignty over part or all of the claimed territory (as discussed earlier). A history of recent conflict appears to improve the effectiveness of agreements that are reached, in terms of both compliance with the agreement and the eventual termination of the claim; the results are much stronger for a conflict history that includes fatalities than for a strictly non-fatal conflict history. Agreements reached after recent fatal armed conflict are much more likely both to be carried out by both sides and to terminate the claim, with compliance increasing from 69.0 percent to 88.4 percent and claim termination increasing from 47.4 percent to 72.2 percent; both results are statistically significant ($X^2 = 7.05$ and 3.98 respectively, 1 d.f., p < .01 and < .05). Weaker results are obtained when the conflict history measures the occurrence of any militarized dispute(s), whether or not they produced fatalities, although the direction of the relationship remains the same ($X^2 = 3.57$ and 2.45 respectively, 1 d.f., p < .06 and p < .12). It appears, then, that a history of recent conflict can provide an important incentive for leaders to carry out their agreements and to end their claims, rather than risking further escalation.

[Table 6 about here]

As before, Table 6 extends the bivariate analyses from Table 5 with a logit analysis of recent conflict involvement and settlement attempt effectiveness. Because of the stronger results in Table 5, Table 6 focuses on the impact of a conflict history that includes fatalities.[9] A history of at least one recent fatal militarized disputes slightly decreases the probability of reaching agreements (p < .09), although non-binding third party attempts significantly decrease the likelihood of an agreement and binding third party attempts significantly increase this likelihood. Fatal disputes significantly increase the probability of compliance with agreements and of ending the territorial claim, though, again consistent with the results from Table 5.

In order to avoid misleading results due to the combination of dissimilar categories, this table uses two dummy variables to indicate whether a given settlement attempt or agreement involves

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[9] Replacing the fatality measure with a measure using any militarized dispute(s) produces similar but weaker results, with the recent militarized disputes variable rarely attaining conventional levels of statistical significance but little else changing in the model. Similar results are generally obtained when a ten-year window is used to identify "recent" militarized conflict rather than five, although results with a fifteen-year window are generally much weaker (not surprisingly because so much can happen in the interim); similar results are also obtained when the dummy variable indicating at least one recent dispute is replaced with a count of recent disputes.

procedural or functional concerns rather than sovereignty over part of all of the claimed territory.[10] Procedural attempts are significantly more likely than sovereignty attempts (the reference category) to produce agreements, although they do not differ in terms of compliance; functional attempts are significantly more likely than sovereignty attempts both to produce agreements and to see these agreements carried out. Higher claim salience decreases the effectiveness of settlement attempts along all three dimensions, indicating that certain claims are difficult to resolve no matter which technique is tried. Finally, more democratic dyads are somewhat less likely to reach agreements, but more likely to carry them out. This latter result is consistent with arguments about democracies being better able than other regime types to make credible commitments; democratic dyads often encounter difficulties in reaching agreements, perhaps because each side attempts to use its domestic audience as a bargaining chip (or because the domestic audience exercises legitimate influence on the leader), but democracies appear likely to keep their commitments to other democracies once these commitments have been made.

These results suggest weak support for Hypothesis 2, which predicted a reduced probability of reaching agreements in the aftermath of recent conflict, but offer strong support for Hypothesis 3's expectation that agreements in such situations are likely to be more successful. These results also support the expectation that recent militarized disputes producing fatalities will have a greater impact than other disputes. Overall, then, this paper's hypotheses have generally been supported, with militarized conflict offering an ineffective way to pursue one's territorial goals and also exerting a generally negative short-term impact on peaceful settlement but a more positive longer-term impact if an agreement can somehow be reached.

Conclusions and Implications

This study's preliminary analyses have suggested that militarized conflict plays a very important role in the management and settlement of territorial claims. Militarized disputes are relatively infrequent, making up only about one-fifth of all attempts to settle territorial claims, but they have an impact well beyond their numbers. Militarized disputes over territory are less likely than other settlement attempts to end contention over territory, which is consistent with past research suggesting that militarized disputes are likely to be followed by renewed conflict. Peaceful settlement attempts begun within five years of fatal militarized conflict are less likely to reach agreements than are comparable attempts that take place in a more peaceful context, which suggests a negative impact of armed conflict on even peaceful settlement attempts. Yet peaceful attempts that reach agreement in the aftermath of fatal armed conflict are more likely to be carried out than other attempts, and are also more likely to end contention over the territorial claim. This suggests that the impact of militarized conflict may not be entirely negative, although the exact reasons underlying this finding remain unclear.

One possible explanation for the effectiveness of agreements reached after fatal armed conflict involves leaders' fear of escalation, which would be consistent with the oft-hypothesized but rarely supported "war weariness" phenomenon, and which could account for the "ripeness"

of conflict situations for a peaceful settlement. Another possibility is that fatal militarized conflicts "activate" domestic audiences to focus on international issues, leading them to pressure leaders to avoid future conflict and to settle issues peacefully -- although it is also possible that an activated domestic audience could press the leader to be even firmer over the issue, lest their countrymen's blood have been spilled in vain. It may be that such violent episodes bring the conflict to the attention of international actors -- whether other states or international organizations -- that then attempt to induce a settlement of the issue to avoid the recurrence of armed conflict -- although non-binding third party settlements (the type of activity most likely to be associated with this situation) remain relatively unlikely to produce peaceful settlements even after fatalities have been produced. It may also be that the answer depends on other factors, such as the outcomes of past conflicts or the perceptions of leaders on each side; much of the scholarly literature on "ripeness" and conflict management refers to a "mutually hurting stalemate" where both sides recognize that they are unable to resolve the issue through further military force (e.g., Zartman 1985, 2000; Kleiboer 1994; Greig 2001). Whether all or none of these possibilities turn out to be relevant, future research could benefit greatly from a better understanding of the mechanism(s) behind this relationship.

Beyond a better understanding of the mechanisms at work behind this findings, other important theoretical and empirical gains might also be made by considering both peaceful and militarized activities as comparable attempts to settle territorial issues. Both peaceful and militarized activities can resolve issues by themselves, and both can have an important impact on the effectiveness of subsequent settlement attempts. Indeed, the most important impact of militarized conflicts on issue settlement involves the influence of military relations on the effectiveness of peaceful settlement attempts, with a legacy of militarized conflict both complicating negotiations by making an agreement less likely, and increasing the effectiveness of agreements that are reached. It would be desirable for future research to be more aware of this comparability (and this reciprocal relationship) between militarized and peaceful attempts to settle contentious issues.

Another set of potential improvements for future research involves a focus on the severity of militarized conflict over territory, as both as independent and a dependent variable. While there are hundreds of militarized disputes over territory, only a small fraction of these disputes escalate to war, and most do not even produce a single fatality. Future research could profitably attempt to study the sources of conflict behavior within each militarized dispute, beginning with characteristics of the claim itself such as the salience of the claimed territory. Furthermore, a closer focus on details of each dispute over territory could improve our understanding of the impact of militarized conflict. The present study has either considered all militarized disputes over territorial issues to have an equivalent impact, or at best distinguished disputes based on whether or not they produced any fatalities. Numerous other distinctions could be made, though, offering much greater variation in dispute characteristics that might influence other concurrent or subsequent interactions over territorial issues.

Also on the subject of militarized conflict and territorial claims, it would be desirable to focus more explicitly on territorial claims' connection with enduring interstate rivalries. Vasquez

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(1993), for example, suggested that most enduring rivalries appear to involve territorial issues -- but that analysis was based more on the contiguity of the rivals in his list than on any available data on issues separating the adversaries. As data on territorial issues begins to accumulate, scholars now have the opportunity to examine the relationship between territorial issues and interstate rivalries in ways that were not possible just a few years ago. For example, the leading lists of interstate rivalries -- those compiled by Goertz and Diehl and by Thompson -- could easily be examined for territorial issues, at least for regions covered by completed ICOW data (or Huth's data set could be used for post-World War I rivalries). Such an analysis would allow scholars to answer such questions as how many territorial claims generate long-term interstate rivalries, how many rivalries begin out of territorial claims, and whether (or to what extent) territorial rivalries differ from those primarily concerning other issues in duration, severity, or other dimensions. Another potentially important analysis could be based on Vasquez' (1993) argument that once territorial issues are settled between two adversaries, their relations are likely to become much more peaceful; enough rivalries have addressed territorial issues that future research could examine the changes in the management of territorial claims when a militarized rivalry ends, the changes in rivalry behavior once a territorial claim ends, and similar developments.

In short, this study has suggested an important connection between militarized conflict and peaceful conflict management efforts. Despite the prominence of armed conflict over territory both in daily newspapers and in major conflict data sets, militarized conflict has been remarkably unsuccessful at resolving territory claims, and it decreases the short-term effectiveness of subsequent attempts to resolve the underlying issues peacefully. Further research is urged to increase our understanding of the longer-term effectiveness of militarized conflict, and to address further topics in the connection between militarized conflict and territorial claims.

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Table 1. Territorial Claims in the Western Hemisphere, 1816-2001

Claim	Participants	Dates
North America		
Passamaquoddy Bay	USA - UK	1816 - 1817
St. Croix - St. John Rivers	USA - UK	1816 - 1842
49th Parallel	USA - UK	1816 - 1818
Oregon Country	USA - UK	1816 - 1846
& Haro Channel	USA - Spain	1816 - 1821
	Spain - UK	1816 - 1821
	USA - UK	1846 - 1872
Alaska	Russia - UK	1821 - 1867
	USA – Russia	1822 – 1867
	UK - USA	1872 - 1903
Labrador	Canada - UK	1920 - 1927
Florida	USA - Spain	1816 - 1821
Texas	USA - Spain	1816 - 1821
	USA - Mexico	1831 - 1848
Mesilla Valley	USA - Mexico	1850 - 1854
Morteritos & Sabinitos	Mexico - USA	1884 - 1884
Río Grande Bancos	Mexico - USA	1884 - 1972
& El Chamizal	Mexico - USA	1895 - 1963
California - New Mexico	USA - Mexico	1835 - 1848
Fort Ross	Russia - Spain	1816 - 1821
	Russia - Mexico	1831 - 1841
Central America and Caribbean		
Cuba	USA - Spain	1848 - 1898
Isla de Pinos	USA - Cuba	1909 - 1925
Guantánamo Bay	Cuba - USA	1960 -
Navassa Island	Haiti - USA	1859 - 1914
	Haiti - USA	1935 -
Môle St. Nicholas	USA - Haiti	1889 - 1915
Samaná Bay	USA - Dom. Rep.	1894 - 1904
Virgin Islands	USA - Denmark	1865 - 1917
Río Massacre	Haiti - Dom. Rep.	1894 - 1914
	Haiti - Dom. Rep.	1934 - 1935
Quita Sueño-Roncador-Serrana	Colombia - USA	1890 - 1972
	Nicaragua - USA	1900 - 1928
	Nicaragua - Colombia	1900 - 1928
	Honduras - USA	1899 - 1928
	Honduras - Colombia	1899 - 1928
San Andrés y Providencia	Nicaragua - Colombia	1900 - 1930
	Nicaragua - Colombia	1979 -
Clipperton Island	France - Mexico	1897 - 1934
Río Hondo	Mexico - UK	1831 - 1897
Chiapas	Guatemala - Mexico	1868 - 1882
Belize	Guatemala - UK	1868 - 1981
	Guatemala - Belize	1981 -

Ranguana-Sapodilla	Belize - Guatemala	1981 -
	Honduras - Belize	1981 -
	Honduras - Guatemala	1981 -
Mosquitia	Colombia - UK	1831 - 1848
	UK - Nicaragua	1900 - 1905
Río Motagua	Honduras - Guatemala	1899 - 1933
Cordillera Monte Cristo	Guatemala - El Salvador	1935 - 1938
Bolsones	El Salvador - Honduras	1899 - 1992
Gulf of Fonseca Islands	Honduras - El Salvador	1899 - 1992
Teotecacinte	Nicaragua - Honduras	1900 - 1906
	Nicaragua - Honduras	1912 - 1961
Cayo Sur	Nicaragua - Honduras	2000 -
Swan Islands	Honduras - USA	1921 - 1972
Mangles (Corn) Islands	Nicaragua - USA	1906 - 1928
	Nicaragua - USA	1965 - 1971
Río Sixaola y Río Coto	Costa Rica - Panama	1920 - 1941
Juradó	Panama - Colombia	1920 - 1938
Canal Zone	USA - Colombia	1899 - 1903
	Colombia - USA	1903 - 1922
	Panama - USA	1920 - 1979

South America

Goajirá-Guainía	Venezuela - Colombia	1841 - 1922
& Serranía del Perijá	Venezuela - Colombia	1922 - 1998
Los Monjes	Colombia - Venezuela	1951 -
Oriente-Aguarico	Ecuador - Colombia	1854 - 1919
Loreto	Peru - Colombia	1839 - 1922
& Leticia	Peru - Colombia	1932 - 1935
Apaporis	Brazil - Colombia	1831 - 1928
Aves Island	Venezuela - Netherlands	1854 - 1865
Essequibo	Venezuela - UK	1841 - 1899
	Venezuela - UK	1951 - 1966
	Venezuela - Guyana	1966 -
Patos Island	Venezuela - UK	1859 - 1942
Amazonas	Venezuela - Brazil	1841 - 1928
Los Roques	Netherlands - Venezuela	1850 - 1856
Corentyn/New River Triangle	Netherlands - UK	1816 - 1966
	Netherlands - Guyana	1966 - 1975
	Suriname - Guyana	1975 -
Pirara	Brazil - UK	1838 - 1926
Maroni	Netherlands - France	1849 - 1975
	Suriname - France	1975 -
Tumuc-Humac	Brazil - Netherlands	1852 - 1906
Amapá	Portugal - France	1816 - 1822
	France - Brazil	1826 - 1900
Oriente-Mainas	Ecuador - Peru	1854 - 1945
& Cordillera del Cóndor	Ecuador - Peru	1947 - 1998
Amazonas-Caquetá	Ecuador - Brazil	1854 - 1904
& Amazonas-Iça	Brazil - Ecuador	1904 - 1922
Chincha Islands	Spain - Peru	1864 - 1866
Acre-Purús	Peru - Brazil	1839 - 1909
Acre-Madre de Dios	Peru - Bolivia	1848 - 1912

Acre-Abuná	Brazil - Bolivia	1848 - 1909
Apa	Paraguay - Brazil	1846 - 1874
& Río Paraguay Islands	Paraguay - Brazil	1874 - 1929
Misiones	Argentina - Brazil	1841 - 1895
Yaguarón	Uruguay - Brazil	1882 -
Trindade Island	Brazil - UK	1826 - 1896
Chaco Boreal	Bolivia - Paraguay	1878 - 1939
Antofagasta	Chile - Bolivia	1848 - 1884
& Tacna-Arica	Bolivia - Chile	1884 -
	Chile - Peru	1879 - 1884
	Peru - Chile	1884 - 1929
	Bolivia - Peru	1883 - 1936
Puna de Atacama	Argentina - Bolivia	1841 - 1941
Chaco Central	Argentina - Paraguay	1846 - 1878
Patagonia	Chile - Argentina	1841 - 1903
Los Andes	Chile - Argentina	1896 - 1904
Beagle Channel	Argentina - Chile	1904 - 1985
Palena/Continental Glaciers	Chile - Argentina	1903 - 1998
Río de La Plata	Argentina - Uruguay	1882 - 1973
Falkland (Malvinas) Islands	Argentina - UK	1841 -

Note: claim dates are constrained by membership in the COW international system, limiting these claims to interactions between recognized sovereign states. Claims can not begin until both states qualify for system membership, and claims are considered to end with the loss of system membership.

Table 2: Territorial Claims and Militarized Conflict

A. Proportion of Claims Producing Militarized Conflict

At least one militarized dispute over claim?

Claim Salience	No	Yes (%)	N
Low	13	12 (48.0%)	25
Moderate	14	15 (51.7%)	29
High	2	19 (90.5%)	21
Total	*29*	*46 (61.3%)*	*75*

$X^2 = 10.52$ (2 d.f., p < .01)

B. Militarized and Peaceful Settlement Attempts

Claim Salience	Militarized disputes Mean (S.D.)	N	Peaceful settlement attempts Mean (S.D.)
Low	1.4 (3.8)	25	3.4 (4.7)
Moderate	0.9 (1.1)	29	8.0 (6.8)
High	5.0 (7.1)	21	18.7 (16.8)
Total	*2.3 (4.8)*	*75*	*9.5 (11.7)*

F = 7.71 (2 d.f., p < .001)   F = 13.27 (2 d.f., p < .001)

Table 3: Settlement Attempts and Claim Termination

	Does settlement attempt end dyadic claim?		
Settlement Attempt	No	Yes (%)	N
Bilateral Negotiations	207	50 (19.5%)	257
Non-binding Third Party	54	10 (15.6)	64
Binding Third Party	10	25 (71.4)	35
MID	166	10 (5.7)	176
Total	*437*	*95 (17.9%)*	*532*

$X^2 = 86.93$ (3 d.f., $p < .001$)

Notes:
• This table only includes peaceful settlement attempts that involved sovereignty over part or all of the claimed territory. Functional and procedural attempts are excluded, because (by definition) the are not attempting to end the claim.

Table 4: Logit Analysis of Claim Termination

Variable	Est. (S.E.)
Constant	- 0.42 (0.41)
Settlement Attempt: **Militarized Dispute**	**- 1.37 (0.36)***
Non-binding	- 0.12 (0.39)
Binding	2.30 (0.41)***
Controls: Claim Salience	- 0.16 (0.06)***
Dyadic Democracy	- 0.03 (0.03)
LL (full model):	- 208.21
Improvement:	82.43
Significance:	p < .001 (5 d.f.)
N:	53

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

Notes:
• This table only includes peaceful settlement attempts that involved sovereignty over part or all of the claimed territory. Functional and procedural attempts are excluded, because (by definition) the are not attempting to end the claim.

Table 5: Recent MIDs and Effectiveness of Peaceful Settlement Attempts

	Column I: All MIDs			*Column II: Fatal MIDs*		

A. Reaching Agreement

Agreement Reached?

Past Conflict?	No	Yes (%)	N	No	Yes (%)	N
Recent MID	109	124 (53.2%)	233	50	43 (46.2%)	93
No Recent MID	181	296 (62.1)	477	240	377 (61.1)	617
Total	*290*	*420 (59.1)*	*710*	*290*	*420 (59.2)*	*710*

$X^2 = 5.06$ (1 d.f., p < .03) $X^2 = 7.39$ (1 d.f., p < .01)

B. Compliance with Agreements

Do Both Sides Comply?

Past Conflict?	No	Yes (%)	N	No	Yes (%)	N
Recent MID	28	96 (77.4%)	124	5	38 (88.4%)	43
No Recent MID	94	202 (68.2)	296	117	260 (69.0)	377
Total	*122*	*298 (71.0)*	*420*	*122*	*298 (71.0)*	*420*

$X^2 = 3.57$ (1 d.f., p < .06) $X^2 = 7.05$ (1 d.f., p < .01)

C. Claim Termination

Does Agreement End Claim?

Past Conflict?	No	Yes (%)	N	No	Yes (%)	N
Recent MID	18	27 (60.0%)	45	5	13 (72.2%)	18
No Recent MID	67	58 (46.4)	125	80	72 (47.4)	152
Total	*85*	*85 (50.0)*	*170*	*85*	*85 (50.0)*	*170*

$X^2 = 2.45$ (1 d.f., p < .12) $X^2 = 3.98$ (1 d.f., p < .05)

Notes:
• "Recent" indicates that at least one militarized interstate dispute (or fatal militarized dispute) was underway in the five years prior to the beginning of this settlement attempt.
• The compliance and claim termination analyses only include settlement attempts that produced a treaty or other agreement. The claim termination analyses also exclude functional and procedural settlement attempts, which are not attempting to end the claim.

Table 6: Logit Analysis of Peaceful Settlement Attempt Effectiveness

Variable	Model 1 (Reach Agreement) Est. (S.E.)	Model 2 (Both Comply) Est. (S.E.)	Model 3 (End Claim) Est. (S.E.)
Constant	0.91 (0.30)***	2.59 (0.46)***	0.85 (0.58)
Recent Fatal MID	**- 0.43 (0.25)***	**1.42 (0.51)***	**1.25 (0.60)***
Settlement Attempt: Non-Binding	- 0.56 (0.21)***	- 0.09 (0.34)	0.18 (0.55)
Binding	2.74 (0.74)***	0.42 (0.47)	1.36 (0.46)***
Procedural Attempt	0.67 (0.18)***	- 0.06 (0.25)	---
Functional Attempt	1.08 (0.27)***	0.82 (0.37)**	---
Controls: Claim Salience	- 0.12 (0.04)***	- 0.25 (0.06)***	- 0.19 (0.08)**
Dyadic Democracy	- 0.03 (0.02)*	0.04 (0.02)*	- 0.01 (0.04)
LL (full model):	- 440.90	- 233.68	- 106.68
Improvement:	76.74	38.81	22.32
Significance:	p < .001 (7 d.f.)	p < .001 (7 d.f.)	p < .001 (5 d.f.)
N:	709	420	170

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

Notes:
• The compliance and claim termination analyses only include settlement attempts that produced a treaty or other agreement.