

PSCI 6830: International Conflict

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Office Hours: M 2-3, WF 11:30-12:30

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Thursdays, 2:00-4:50 PM

125A Wooten Hall

Course Description

This course examines theoretical and empirical work on the causes and consequences of militarized conflict between nation-states. We will consider causes from a variety of different levels of analysis (ranging from individual psychology to national attributes or interactions and the structure of the entire global system) and a variety of different theoretical perspectives (including work drawing from realism, institutionalism, and everything in between). After taking the course, students should be familiar with the scientific literature on militarized conflict, should be able to evaluate this literature in a critical yet constructive fashion, and should be able to begin producing their own research in this area.

It should be noted that this will not be a history course, and we will not be discussing or examining individual wars. The assigned readings emphasize generalizable theories and quantitative evidence on general patterns of conflict involvement across time and space, and this will be the focus of our discussions in this course. Students wishing to study or discuss specific conflicts/wars or current events are encouraged to take courses from the History department or to form their own discussion groups, as we will not be discussing these types of topics in this course.

This course is an important part of the Political Science Ph.D. program, and will thus be aimed at preparing Ph.D. students to pass their qualifying exams and to become serious scholars of conflict. Students from other departments or programs are welcome to take the course, as long as they can keep up with a course taught at this level. It must be emphasized that this course will involve intensive reading of advanced scholarly research; nearly every reading that is assigned involves formal mathematical models, quantitative data analysis, or both. While students are not necessarily expected to be able to produce their own quantitative and/or formal research, they must be able to understand and discuss it. Students who are unable to do this or who are unwilling to accept the validity of quantitative analyses of conflict patterns should avoid this course, as they will be wasting both their own time and that of their classmates, and their grades for participation and for the discussion papers will reflect this.

Required Texts

The following book is **required**. It has been ordered from the campus bookstores, and should also be available at numerous online locations:

- Sara McLaughlin Mitchell and John A. Vasquez (2021). *What Do We Know About War?*, 3rd edition. New York: Rowman and Littlefield. ISBN 978-1538140093.

Two other books are **optional**. No material in these books will be required for this course, but they contain a lot of useful material that may be valuable to anybody interested in doing further research (or taking field exams) in this area, much of which is listed in this syllabus as “optional readings”:

- Jack S. Levy and William R. Thompson (2010). *Causes of War*. Wiley-Blackwell. ISBN 978-1405175593.
- Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, Paul F. Diehl, and James D. Morrow, eds. (2012). *Guide to the Scientific Study of International Processes*. Wiley-Blackwell. ISBN 978-1118306048.

Most of the other readings are available through JSTOR or UNT's other e-journal subscriptions; the ones that are not will be made available on the Canvas page for this course.

Course Requirements

(1) *Attendance and Participation (25% of course grade)*

Because this is a graduate seminar, the instructor will not run class meetings as a lecture; all students are expected to come to each class meeting prepared to discuss the readings. This will involve spending the time to read each

book or article on the reading list, and thinking about what each reading contributes to the weekly topic. Class discussion every week will focus on such issues as the theoretical arguments being made (explicitly or implicitly), the empirical evidence that is marshaled to test these arguments, weaknesses or shortcomings of the work so far, and potential directions for future research. Note that coming to class late, or missing class without documentation of a very pressing concern, is completely unacceptable in a graduate seminar and will be penalized accordingly.

(2) In-Class Presentations (25% of course grade)

Beyond regular class attendance and active participation in class discussion, each student is expected to make 4-5 presentations to the rest of the class on the weekly topics (with the total depending on the number of students taking the course). The presentations should involve identifying one or more important questions related to the week's topic that have been left unanswered or answered incompletely by the readings (and offering tentative suggestions on how such gaps might be filled in future research), and/or proposing some extension of the week's readings to a new question or area. The discussion questions suggested in the syllabus offer a good place to begin in thinking about these presentations (but don't feel limited to these suggestions; feel free to head off in a different direction). Each presentation should be described in a 3-to-4-page paper to be handed in for evaluation. ***Note that these discussion papers should be turned in through the week's TurnItIn link on Canvas before the start of the class period.***

These presentations are meant to help focus the class discussion on new directions from the week's readings, and to help identify interesting directions for future research (perhaps even for this course's research paper). They should be written from a research-oriented, academic perspective, rather than a literature review or a Siskel-and-Ebert-style review ("I liked/hated this article" or "thumbs up/down"), and should be constructive; criticisms of assigned readings should be accompanied by one or more suggestions about how to overcome the problems, with appropriate discussion of the implications of these suggestions for the body of research. It is not recommended that these discussion papers focus on an assigned reading that was primarily a literature review (as with many of the chapters in the required books), as those are similar in format to these papers; if you are going to focus on a review article/chapter, the discussion paper will need to focus on ways to extend the literature beyond what the original article/chapter already suggested.

The following general grading scale will be used for both participation and presentations:

- A to A- (90-100): The student made a very strong contribution to the course. Class discussion, comments, and/or presentations reflected a great deal of thought about the material, and were constructive (for example, not only identifying current weaknesses and showing how these weaknesses limit the current literature, but suggesting useful future directions that could help to overcome these weaknesses or to extend the literature in important ways).
- B+ to B- (80-89): The student contributed meaningfully to the course. Class participation and/or presentations went beyond repeating the assigned material, perhaps identifying weaknesses in the current literature, but did not make many constructive suggestions about how these weaknesses might be overcome or how the literature might usefully be extended in the future.
- C+ to C- (70-79) or lower: The student did not contribute meaningfully. Class participation and/or presentations were limited to repeating the assigned material rather than making connections or extensions, or were filled with mistakes and inaccuracies.
- D or F (69 or lower): The student was a net drain on the course, rarely if ever speaking in class or failing to make the required number of presentations.

(3) Research Paper

Another requirement is an original research paper, involving the development and systematic testing of one or more hypotheses on the causes, management, or consequences of militarized interstate conflict. This paper may be quantitative or qualitative in nature, depending on the nature of the question and the student's methodological training, but in any case it must be analytical and theoretical in nature rather than descriptive. The final paper must be **at least 20 pages in length** (using standard font and margins, either 1.5- or double-spaced), and should be comparable to an academic journal article in style. Please note that this must be an original paper for this course, and can not overlap in any substantial way with a paper written for another course; if there is any question

please talk to me about it and bring me a copy of the other paper.

The paper will be written in a number of stages, each of which will be graded separately:

Week 5, Paper Proposal (5% of course grade): Submit a 2-3 page proposal for your paper topic. This proposal must be primarily theoretical (the research design and data issues can be addressed later) and will involve a brief description of the paper topic, including a statement of what the student plans to study, a summary of what has been found in relevant research on related topics, and a discussion of the basic theoretical logic and hypotheses that will be tested here. This proposal will be evaluated and graded based on the appropriateness of the topic for this course, as well as the completeness and coherence of the theoretical logic and hypotheses to be tested. An 'A' grade will require that the topic be appropriate for this course, the general theoretical approach be explained well, and the hypotheses be testable and clearly related to this theoretical approach. ***Note that the paper proposals should be turned in through the TurnItIn link on Canvas before the start of the class period.***

Week 8, Research Design (5%): Submit a 5-7 page research design laying out the details of how you will approach your paper topic. This will involve more detailed discussion of the paper's overall theoretical approach and your specific hypotheses than in the original proposal, as well as a statement and justification of how these hypotheses will be tested. Regardless of the methodological approach being used, you will need to specify and justify your spatial-temporal domain (which cases will be studied), your dependent variable or variables (what you will be trying to explain), your independent variables (the variables from your hypotheses that you will be using to try to explain the dependent variables), any control variables that you will also be considering to increase confidence in your tests by ruling out alternative explanations, and an explanation of how each of these variables will be measured (including the needed data sources as well as specific details of measurement).

At this point the basic ideas of the paper should be finalized and it should be clear how all of the hypotheses will be tested, leaving the rest of the semester to carry out these tests and write up the results and conclusions. This research design will be evaluated and graded based on the theoretical logic and hypotheses (as with the initial proposal but presumably developed further by this point), as well the completeness of the research design and the appropriateness of this design for testing the specific hypotheses that are laid out. An 'A' grade will require that the theoretical logic and hypotheses be complete and well thought out, the spatial-temporal domain and case selection for the analyses be appropriate, and reasonable measures and data sources be provided for each variable to be used in the study (including all dependent, independent, and control variables). ***Note that the research designs should be turned in through the TurnItIn link on Canvas before the start of the class period.***

Week 13, First Draft (10%): Submit a complete first draft of your research paper. By this time, every part of the paper should be completed -- introduction, literature review, theory/hypotheses, research design, analysis, conclusions, and references. This will be graded like the final version of the paper (as described below), but with the recognition that it may not be as well-developed as the final version will, and the goal of giving each student feedback to make the final version of the paper better.

Email an electronic copy of your draft to the instructor before the beginning of class (preferably in an editable format like .doc, .docx, or .rtf). The instructor will grade one copy, and send copies to two students in the course so that they can write an anonymous review of the paper.

Week 14, Reviews (5%): An important part of academic careers is the peer review process, for both getting feedback on your own research and providing feedback to other scholars as they seek to publish their research. Each student in this course will provide an anonymous review to two fellow students, giving feedback on the first draft of the paper as well as constructive suggestions on how to improve the project before the final paper is due. More detailed instructions and examples will be distributed in class no later than the time that the first drafts of the paper are due. Your reviews will be graded based on the quality of the feedback offered to the authors of the two papers. An 'A' grade will require that the review accurately summarize what the author has attempted to do, give useful feedback on the strengths and weaknesses of the current version of the paper, and offer constructive advice on how the paper can be improved -- ideally addressing relevant aspects of the literature review, theory/hypotheses, and research design/analyses.

Email an electronic copy of each of your reviews to the instructor before the beginning of class

(preferably in an editable format like .doc, .docx, or .rtf so that all reviews of each paper can be combined into a single review document).

Week 16, Presentation: The final class meeting of the semester will give each student an opportunity to present his/her research paper to the entire class. More details are provided at the end of this syllabus; these presentations will be graded as part of the class participation grade.

Final Exam Period, Final Paper (25%): ***The final version of your research paper must be turned in through the TurnItIn link on the course's Canvas page no later than the scheduled final exam period for this course.*** This final version of the paper must include a memo describing the changes that have been made in response to the written reviewers' comments -- note that TurnItIn does not allow you to turn in two separate documents, so please make sure that this memo is part of your main paper submission.

The final paper will be graded on the clarity and contribution of the theory as an addition to the relevant scholarly literature, as well as on the appropriateness of the analyses as a test of this theory. An 'A' grade will require that the literature review, theory, and hypotheses be clear and complete, the analyses be conducted appropriately for testing these hypotheses (given the student's level of research training at this point in his/her studies), and the results and conclusions be related appropriately to this paper's theory/hypotheses as well as to the broader scholarly literature and (where appropriate) to implications for policy makers.

Please note that the memo responding to the reviews of your paper is important here, just as it is for manuscripts at professional journals. Be sure to take the reviews seriously, and explain in the memo how you addressed each point that they raised. If you did not feel that a particular point was relevant or appropriate, justify in this memo why you felt this was the case. Just as reviewers will consider the previous review when evaluating a paper that has been revised and resubmitted, your final paper will be graded on responding to the earlier review as well as on its own merits.

Academic Integrity

Academic integrity is defined in the UNT Policy on Student Standards for Academic Integrity, which is located at: <<http://policy.unt.edu/policy/06-003>>. This includes such issues as cheating (including use of unauthorized materials or other assistance on course assignments or examinations), plagiarism (whether intentional or negligent), forgery, fabrication, facilitating academic dishonesty, and sabotage. All students should review the policy carefully; failure to read or understand the policy does not protect you from sanctions for violating it.

Any suspected case of academic dishonesty will be handled in accordance with current University policy and procedures. Possible academic penalties range from a verbal or written admonition to a grade of "F" in the course; further sanctions may apply to incidents involving major violations. You will find the policy and procedures at <<http://facultysuccess.unt.edu/academic-integrity>>.

Americans with Disabilities Act

UNT is committed to making reasonable academic accommodation for students with disabilities. Students seeking reasonable accommodation must register with the Office of Disability Access (ODA) each semester to verify their eligibility. If a disability is verified, the ODA will contact me with a letter listing recommended accommodations; you will then need to discuss these with me so we can decide how to meet your specific needs in the course. It is advisable to discuss these issues as early as possible in the semester to avoid any delay in implementation. Note that if we agree that you can take exams at the ODA testing center, I will need to fill out an online form notifying them, but you will also need to notify them and request exam space at least a week before the test. For additional information see the Office of Disability Accommodation website at <<http://www.unt.edu/oda>>. You may also contact them by phone at (940) 565-4323.

Sexual Discrimination, Harassment, and Assault

UNT is committed to providing an environment free of all forms of discrimination and sexual harassment, including sexual assault, domestic violence, dating violence, and stalking. If you (or someone you know) has experienced or experiences any of these acts of aggression, please know that you are not alone. The federal Title IX law makes it clear that violence and harassment based on sex and gender are Civil Rights offenses. UNT has

staff members rained to support you in navigating campus life, accessing health and counseling services, providing academic and housing accommodations, helping with legal protective orders, and more.

UNT's Dean of Students web site at <<http://deanofstudents.unt.edu/resources>> offers a range of on-campus and off-campus resources to help support survivors, depending on their unique needs. Renee LeClaire McNamara, UNT's Student Advocate, may be reached through email at SurvivorAdvocate@unt.edu or by calling the Dean of Students' office at (940) 565-2648. You are not alone; we are here to help.

Outline of Course

The “Additional Readings” section lists further research on each topic that was not assigned for this course. Students may find this section to be a useful source of material for their research papers. This syllabus could not hope to list every relevant article on each topic, of course, unless it was over 100 pages long. These readings represent a combination of the seminal work in each area and some of the more interesting or innovative recent articles; students are encouraged to look through the bibliographies of these articles for references to additional work.

1. Thursday, Jan. 19: Overview of Course

- No assigned readings

2. Thursday, Jan. 26: Conceptualizing and Studying Conflict

The first substantive meeting of the course focuses on the most fundamental building block for any course on conflict: our understanding of what conflict is. This includes both conceptual and methodological concerns. Conceptually, we need to consider what “conflict,” “war,” and similar concepts mean as forms of human interaction. Methodologically, we need to consider how we can measure these concepts for the purposes of empirical analysis; this will require examining some of the major data sets that have attempted to measure conflict, discussing some of their strengths and weaknesses, and perhaps suggesting our own improvements or alternatives.

Vasquez and Diehl both discuss a number of issues that arise in conceptualizing and studying armed conflict, war, and peace. Ghosn et al. discuss the COW militarized interstate dispute (MID) data, which is more widely used today and offers important advances beyond the war data described by Sarkees et al. Gleditsch et al. then discuss the PRIO/Uppsala armed conflict data, which includes more than just interstate armed conflicts, while Hensel & Mitchell discuss the ICOW project and broaden the focus to contentious issues (not all of which are militarized). Hensel's Guide to SSIP chapter discusses major data sets used in research in the field. Finally, Bennett discusses the notion of “politically relevant dyads,” an important approach that is widely used in empirical studies of conflict.

While doing these readings, think about the conceptual issues addressed by the Vasquez and Diehl readings. How well have these various data sets dealt with these issues, and are there any other important issues that these readings (or these data sets) have not addressed? Are there any other ways that we could improve the conceptualization or measurement of conflict? Also, how much of a difference might we expect if one data set is used rather than another -- do empirical results seem likely to differ, and if so, when and how?

Required Readings:

- John A. Vasquez (1993). *The War Puzzle*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 14-50.
- Paul F. Diehl (2019). "Peace: A Conceptual Survey." *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies*.
- Faten Ghosn, Glenn Palmer, and Stuart Bremer (2004). “The MID3 Data Set, 1993- 2001: Procedures, Coding Rules, and Description.” *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 21, 2: 133-154.
- Meredith Reid Sarkees, Frank Wayman, and J. David Singer (2003). “Inter-State, Intra-State, and Extra-State Wars: A Comprehensive Look at Their Distribution Over Time, 1816-1997” *International Studies Quarterly* 47, 1: 49-70.
- Nils Petter Gleditsch, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg, and Havard Strand (2002). “Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Data Set” *Journal of Peace Research* 39, 5: 615-637.

- Paul R. Hensel and Sara McLaughlin Mitchell (2017). "From Territorial Claims to Identity Claims: The Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) Project." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 34, 2 (March): 126-140.
- *Guide to SSIP*: chapter by Hensel (data sets)
- D. Scott Bennett (2006). "Exploring Operationalizations of Political Relevance." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 23, 3 (September): 245 - 261.

Optional Readings:

- Levy & Thompson: Chapter 1 ("Introduction to the Study of War")
- *What Do We Know about War*, 3rd edition: chapter by Braumoeller (trends in interstate conflict)
- Dina A. Zinnes (1980). "Three Puzzles in Search of a Researcher." *International Studies Quarterly*, 24: 315-342. -- *useful for thinking about framing the research question for your paper*

Additional Readings:

- Geoffrey Blainey (1988). *The Causes of War*, 3rd edition. New York: The Free Press.
- Bremer, Stuart A. 1992. "Dangerous Dyads: Conditions Affecting the Likelihood of Interstate War, 1816-1965." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 36(2): 309-341.
- Stuart A. Bremer (1993). "Advancing the Scientific Study of War." *International Interactions*, 19(1-2): 1-26.
- Aaron Clauset (2018). "Trends and Fluctuations in the Severity of Interstate Wars." *Science Advances* 4, 2.
- Douglas M. Gibler, Steven V. Miller, and Erin K. Little (2016). "An Analysis of the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) Dataset, 1816-2001." *International Studies Quarterly* 60: 719-730.
- Paul F. Diehl (2006). "Just a Phase?: Integrating Conflict Dynamics Over Time." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 23, 3 (September): 199-210.
- Charles S. Gochman and Zeev Maoz (1984). "Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816-1976." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 28 (4): 585-615.
- Gary Goertz, Paul F. Diehl, and Alexandru Balas (2016). *The Puzzle of Peace: The Evolution of Peace in the International System*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Paul R. Hensel (2002). "The More Things Change...: Recognizing and Responding to Trends in Armed Conflict." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 19, 1: 27-52.
- Kalevi Holsti (1991). *Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order, 1648-1989*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 306-334.
- Kalevi Holsti (1996). *The State, War, and the State of War*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Daniel M. Jones, Stuart A. Bremer, and J. David Singer (1996). "Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816-1992: Rationale, Coding Rules, and Empirical Patterns." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 15, 2: 163-213.
- Jack S. Levy (1983). *War in the Modern Great Power System, 1495-1975*. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press
- Evan Luard (1986). *War in International Society*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Zeev Maoz, Paul L. Johnson, Jasper Kaplan, Fiona Ogunkoya, and Aaron P. Shreve (2019). "The Dyadic Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) Dataset Version 3.0: Logic, Characteristics, and Comparisons to Alternative Datasets." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*.
- Glenn Palmer, Vito D'Orazio, Michael Kenwick, and Matthew Lane (2015). "The MID4 dataset, 2002-2010: Procedures, coding rules and description." *Conflict Management and Peace Science*.
- Dan Reiter, Allan C. Stam, and Michael C. Horowitz (2014). "A Revised Look at Interstate Wars, 1816-2007." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*.
- Lewis Fry Richardson (1960). *Statistics of Deadly Quarrels*. Pittsburgh: Boxwood Press.
- Schrodtt, Philip A. (2012). "Precedents, Progress, and Prospects in Political Event Data." *International Interactions* 38(4): 546-569.
- J. David Singer (1970). "The Incomplete Theorist: Insight without Evidence." In Klaus Knorr and James N. Rosenau (eds.), *Contending Approaches to International Politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- J. David Singer and Paul F. Diehl, eds. (1990). *Measuring the Correlates of War*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Melvin Small and J. David Singer (1982). *Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars, 1816-1980*. Beverly Hills: Sage.

- Quincy Wright (1965). *A Study of War*, revised edition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Compilations of Wars and Other Conflicts

- Jacob Bercovitch (1997). *International Conflict: A Chronological Encyclopedia of Conflicts and Their Management, 1945-1995*. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press.
- Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld (1997). *A Study of Crisis*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- James Ciment (1999). *Encyclopedia of Conflicts since World War II*. Armonk, NY: Sharpe Reference.
- David Dreyer and William R. Thompson (2011). *Handbook of International Rivalries*. Thousand Oaks, CA: CQ Press.
- Douglas M. Gibler (2018). *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- George Kohn (1999). *Dictionary of Wars*. New York: Facts on File.
- David Munro and Alan J. Day (1999). *A World Record of Major Conflict Areas*. London: Edward Arnold.
- OnWar.com web site ("Armed Conflict Events Data"):
<<http://www.onwar.com/aced/index.htm>>
- Meredith Reid Sarkees and Frank Wayman (2010). *Resort to War: 1816 - 2007*. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.

3. Thursday, Feb. 2: Systemic Theories

A good place to start our consideration of causes of conflict is with the structure of the international system. In this week we focus on largely static analysis of the system, including theories about polarity and hegemony; next week we will examine the more dynamic topic of power transitions. Some of the earliest quantitative research on international conflict addressed the impact of polarity or of other dimensions of the international system's structure, and work in this area progressed substantially over several decades.

Deutsch & Singer and Waltz engaged in a theoretical debate before the data sets existed to test which form of polarity was safer. Nearly a decade later, Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey's chapter was one of the most prominent early quantitative studies of conflict. That chapter, when compared to the more recent studies assigned here, helps illustrate many of the problems that plagued early work on polarity -- vastly different ways to conceptualize and measure both polarity and war, vastly different results, and the dreaded "inter-century difference." Wayman, Kadera et al., and Gortzak et al. offer improvements in one or more areas; think about each of their measures of system structure and war, their research design, and their results when trying to evaluate this body of work. Thinking about all of these readings, has the systemic study of conflict and war really advanced (and if so, how), or have things stayed where they were (and if so, why)?

Required Readings:

Reviews:

- *Guide to SSIP*: chapter by Rasler and Thompson (systemic theories)
- *What Do We Know about War*, 3rd edition: chapter by Morey and Kadera (dyadic power distributions and war)

Original Research:

- Karl W. Deutsch and J. David Singer (1964). "Multipolar Systems and International Stability." *World Politics*, 16: 390-406.
- Kenneth N. Waltz (1964). "The Stability of a Bipolar World." *Daedalus* 93 (Summer): 881-909.
- J. David Singer, Stuart A. Bremer, and John Stuckey (1972). "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965." In Bruce M. Russett (ed.), *Peace, War, and Numbers*. Beverly Hills: Sage, pp. 19-48.
- Bruce Bueno de Mesquita (1978). "Systemic Polarization and the Occurrence and Duration of War." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 22(2): 241-267.
- Frank Wayman (1984). "Bipolarity and War." *Journal of Peace Research* 21: 61-78.
- Kelly M. Kadera, Mark J.C. Crescenzi, and Megan L. Shannon (2003). "Democratic Survival, Peace and War in the International System." *American Journal of Political Science* 47(2).
- Yoav Gortzak, Yoram Z. Haftel, and Kevin Sweeney (2005). "Offense-Defense Theory: An Empirical Assessment." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49(1): 67-89.

Optional Readings:

- Levy & Thompson: Chapter 2 ("System-Level Theories")

Additional Readings:

Polarity/System Structure

- Bear Braumoeller (2008). "Systemic Politics and the Origins of Great Power Conflict." *American Political Science Review* 102, 1: 77-93.
- Bear Braumoeller (2013). *The Great Powers and the International System*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Bruce Bueno de Mesquita (1981). "Risk, Power Distributions, and the Likelihood of War." *International Studies Quarterly* 25, 4: 541-568.
- William Domke (1988). *War and the Changing Global System*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Ted Hopf (1991). "Polarity, the Offense-Defense Balance, and War." *American Political Science Review* 85, 2: 475-494.
- Paul K. Huth, D. Scott Bennett, and Christopher Gelpi (1992). "System Uncertainty, Risk Propensity, and International Conflict Among the Great Powers." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 36: 478-517.
- Charles W. Kegley and Gregory A. Raymond (1992). "Must We Fear a Post-Cold War Multipolar System?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 36, 3: 573-585.
- Charles W. Kegley and Gregory A. Raymond (1994). *A Multipolar Peace?* New York: St. Martin's.
- Jack Levy (1984). "Size and Stability in the Modern Great Power System." *International Interactions* 10: 341-358.
- Edward D. Mansfield (1992). "The Concentration of Capabilities and the Onset of War." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 36: 3-24.
- Edward D. Mansfield (1993). "Concentration, Polarity, and the Distribution of Power." *International Studies Quarterly* 37, 1 (March): 105-128.
- David Rapkin, William Thompson, and Jon Christopherson (1979). "Bipolarity and Bipolarization in the Cold War Era." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 23, 2: 261-295.
- James Lee Ray (1990). "The Measurement of System Structure." In J. David Singer and Paul F. Diehl, (eds.) *Measuring the Correlates of War*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 99-114.
- Alan Ned Sabrosky, ed. (1985). *Polarity and War*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Richard J. Stoll (1984). "Bloc Concentration and the Balance of Power." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 28: 25-50.
- William R. Thompson (1988). "Polarity and Global Power Warfare." In *On Global War: Historical-Structural Approaches to World Politics*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, pp. 196-223.
- Kenneth N. Waltz (1979). *Theory of International Politics*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Kenneth N. Waltz (2000). "Structural Realism after the Cold War." *International Security* 25, 1: 5-41.
- Frank Whelon Wayman and T. Clifton Morgan (1990). "Measuring Polarity in the International System" In J. David Singer and Paul F. Diehl (eds.), *Measuring the Correlates of War*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- William C. Wohlforth (1999). "The Stability of a Unipolar World." *International Security* 24, 1: 5-41.

Hegemony (see also *Power Transition* topic as there is some overlap)

- Terry Boswell and Mike Sweat (1991). "Hegemony, Long Waves, and Major Wars: A Time-Series Analysis of System Dynamics, 1496-1967." *International Studies Quarterly*, 35(2): 123-149.
- Robert Gilpin (1981). *War and Change in World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Robert Gilpin (1988). "The Theory of Hegemonic War." *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, 18 (Spring): 591-614.
- Paul Kennedy (1987). *The Rise and Fall of Great Powers*. New York: Vintage Press.
- Robert Keohane (1984). *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Charles A. Kupchan (1998). "After Pax Americana: Benign Power, Regional Integration, and the Sources of a Stable Multipolarity." *International Security* 23(2): 40-79.

- Jack S. Levy (1985). "Theories of General War." *World Politics* 37, 3: 344-374.
- Bruce Russett (1985). "The Mysterious Case of Vanishing Hegemony; or Is Mark Twain Really Dead?" *International Organization*, 39: 207-231.
- Duncan Snidal (1985). "The Limits of Hegemonic Stability." *International Organization* 39: 579-614.
- K. Edward Spiezio (1990). "British Hegemony and Major Power War, 1815-1939: An Empirical Test of Gilpin's Model of Hegemonic Governance." *International Studies Quarterly*, 34, 2: 165-181.
- Arthur A. Stein (1984). "The Hegemon's Dilemma: Great Britain, the United States, and the International Economic Order." *International Organization*, 38: 355-386.
- Susan Strange (1987). "The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony." *International Organization*, 41, 4: 551-574.
- Thomas J. Volgy and Larry Imwalle (1995). "Hegemonic Perspectives on the New World Order." *American Journal of Political Science*, November.

Long Cycles / Power Cycles / Business Cycles

- *Handbook of War Studies II*: chapter by Rasler & Thompson (long cycles)
- Nathaniel Beck (1991). "The Illusion of Cycles in International Relations." *International Studies Quarterly* 35: 455-476.
- Michael Colaresi (2001). "Shocks to the System: Great Power Rivalry and the Leadership Long Cycle." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45, 5: 569-593.
- John Conybeare (1992). "Weak Cycles, Length, and Magnitude of War: Duration Dependence in International Conflict." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 12, 1: 99-116.
- Charles F. Doran and Wes Parsons (1980). "War and the Cycle of Relative Power." *American Political Science Review* 74, 4: 947-965.
- Charles F. Doran (1989). "Systemic Disequilibrium, Foreign Policy Role, and the Power Cycle." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 33 (September): 371-401.
- Charles F. Doran (1991). *Systems in Crisis: New Imperatives of High Politics at Century's End*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Joshua Goldstein (1985). "Kondratieff Waves as War Cycles." *International Studies Quarterly* 29: 411-444.
- Joshua Goldstein (1987). "Long Waves in Production, War, and Inflation: New Empirical Evidence." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 31, 4: 573-600.
- Joshua Goldstein (1988). *Long Cycles: Prosperity and War in the Modern Age*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Joshua Goldstein (1991). "The Possibility of Cycles in International Relations." *International Studies Quarterly* 35:477-480.
- Charles W. Kegley Jr., and Gregory A. Raymond (1989). "The Long Cycle of Global War and the Transformation of Alliance Norms." *Journal of Peace Research* 26: 265-284.
- Jack S. Levy (1991). "Long Cycles, Hegemonic Transitions, and the Long Peace." In Charles W. Kegley, ed., *The Long Postwar Peace*. New York: HarperCollins, pp. 147-176.
- Manus I. Midlarsky (1988). *The Onset of World War*. Boston: Unwin Hyman.
- George Modelski (1978). "The Long Cycle of Global Politics and the Nation-State." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 20 (April): 214-235.
- George Modelski (1987). *Exploring Long Cycles*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
- George Modelski (1987). *Long Cycles in World Politics*. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
- George Modelski and William R. Thompson (1989). *Seapower in Global Politics, 1494-1993*. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
- George Modelski and William R. Thompson (1996). *Leading Sectors and World Politics*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
- George Modelski and William R. Thompson (1999). "The Long and the Short of Global Politics in the Twenty-first Century: An Evolutionary Approach." *International Studies Review* 1, 1: 109-140.
- Brian M. Pollins and Kevin P. Murrin (1999). "Where Hobbes Meets Hobson: Core Conflict and Capitalism, 1495-1985." *International Studies Quarterly* 43, 3; 427-454.
- Brian M. Pollins and Randall L. Schweller. 1999. "Linking the Levels: The Long Wave and Shifts in U.S. Foreign Policy 1790-1993." *American Journal of Political Science*, 43(2): 431-464.

- Karen A. Rasler and William R. Thompson (1983). "Global Wars, Public Debt, and the Long Cycle." *World Politics* 489-516.
- Karen A. Rasler and William R. Thompson (1989). *War and State Making: The Shaping of the Global Powers*. Boston: Unwin Hyman.
- Karen A. Rasler and William R. Thompson (1994). *The Great Powers and Global Struggle, 1490-1990*. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky.
- Richard Rosecrance (1987). "Long Cycle Theory and International Relations." *International Organization* 41 (Spring): 283-301.
- William R. Thompson (1982). "Phases of the Business Cycle and the Outbreak of War." *International Studies Quarterly* 26, 2: 301-311.
- William R. Thompson (1983). "Uneven Economic Growth, Systemic Challenges, and Global Wars." *International Studies Quarterly* 27: 341-355.
- William R. Thompson, ed. (1983). *Contending Approaches to World System Analysis*, Beverly Hills: Sage.
- William R. Thompson (1986). "Polarity, the Long Cycle, and Global Power Warfare." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 30, 4 (December): 587-615.
- William R. Thompson (1988). *On Global War: Historical-Structural Approaches to World Politics*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
- William R. Thompson (1990). "Long Waves, Technological Innovation, and Relative Decline." *International Organization* 44, 2 (Spring): 201-233.
- William R. Thompson (1992). "Dehio, Long Cycles, and the Geohistorical Context of Structural Transition." *World Politics*, 45(1): 127-152.
- William R. Thompson (1993). "Systemic Leadership and Growth Waves in the Long Run." *International Studies Quarterly* 36, 1 (March): 25-48.
- William R. Thompson and Gary Zuk (1982). "War, Inflation, and the Kondratieff Long Wave." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*: 621-644.
- Raimo Vayrynen (1983). "Economic Cycles, Power Transitions, Political Management, and Wars between Major Powers." *International Studies Quarterly* 27 (December): 389-418.
- Immanuel Wallerstein (1984). *The Politics of the World-Economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

4. Thursday, Feb. 9: Power Transition Theory and Power Parity

This topic considers more explicitly dynamic work on systemic causes of war, focusing on fluctuations in specific countries' military and/or economic power, and includes both power transition theory and work on various types of cycles. Power transition theory was introduced by Kenneth Organski in 1958's book World Politics, and its best-known exposition came from Organski and his student Jacek Kugler in 1980's The War Ledger. Kugler's student Lemke has in turn been responsible for some interesting developments since then, when they have argued that the topic might better be termed power parity theory.

In line with this emphasis on power parity, Weede's article is an early attempt to consider the pacifying effects of relative capabilities. Kim's article considers the impact of alliances, rather than just two states' own capabilities. The chapters from Lemke's book then offer an extension to regional adversaries rather than continuing to focus solely on the top great powers.

Required Readings:

Reviews:

- Jacek Kugler and Douglas Lemke (2000). "The Power Transition Research Program: Assessing Theoretical and Empirical Advances." In Manus Midlarsky, ed., *Handbook of War Studies II*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, pp. 129-163.

Original Research:

- A.F.K. Organski and Jacek Kugler (1980). *The War Ledger*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. [chapter 1 only]
- Erich Weede (1976). "Overwhelming Preponderance as a Pacifying Condition Among Contiguous Asian Dyads, 1950-1969." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 20 (3): 395-412.

- Woosang Kim (1991). "Alliance Transitions and Great Power War." *American Journal of Political Science* 35: 833-850.
- Douglas Lemke (2002). *Regions of War and Peace*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [Chapters 3-5]

Additional Readings:

Power Transition Theory

- Indra De Soysa, John R. Oneal and Yong-Hee Park (1997). "Testing Power-Transition Theory Using Alternative Measures of National Capabilities." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41, 4: 509-528. See also Lemke and Reed's 1998 response "Power Is Not Satisfaction: A Comment on de Soysa, Oneal, and Park" (*Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42, 4: 511-516) and Oneal et al.'s 1998 rejoinder "But Power and Wealth Are Satisfying: A Reply to Lemke and Reed" (*Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42, 4: 517-520).
- Jonathan M. DiCicco and Jack S. Levy (1999). "Power Shifts and Problem Shifts: The Evolution of the Power Transition Research Program." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 43 (6): 675-704.
- Daniel S. Geller (1992). "Power Transition and Conflict Initiation." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 12: 1-16.
- Henk W. Houweling and Jan G. Siccama (1988). "Power Transitions as a Cause of War." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 32 (1): 87-102.
- Henk W. Houweling and Jan G. Siccama (1991). "Power Transitions and Critical Points as Predictors of Great Power War." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 35: 642-658.
- Woosang Kim (1989). "Power, Alliance, and Major Wars, 1816-1975." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 33, 2: 255-273.
- Woosang Kim (1992). "Power Transitions and Great Power War from Westphalia to Waterloo." *World Politics* October: 153-172.
- Woosang Kim (2002). "Power Parity, Alliance, Dissatisfaction, and Wars in East Asia, 1860-1993." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46, 5 (October): 654-671.
- Woosang Kim and James D. Morrow (1992). "When Do Power Shifts Lead to War?" *American Journal of Political Science* 36: 896-922.
- Jacek Kugler and Douglas Lemke, eds. (1996). *Parity and War: Evaluations and Extensions of The War Ledger*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Richard Ned Lebow (1984). "Windows of Opportunity: Do States Jump Through Them?" *International Security* 9 (Summer): 147-186.
- Douglas Lemke (1997). "The Continuation of History: Power Transition Theory and the End of the Cold War." *Journal of Peace Research* 34, 1: 23-36.
- Douglas Lemke and Suzanne Werner (1996). "Power Parity, Commitment to Change, and War." *International Studies Quarterly* 40 (2): 235-260.
- Jack S. Levy (1987). "Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War." *World Politics* 40: 82-107.
- Robert Powell (1996). "Uncertainty, Shifting Power, and Appeasement." *American Political Science Review* 90, 4 (December): 749-764.

Parity/Preponderance

- Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James D. Morrow, and Ethan R. Zorick (1997). "Capabilities, Perception, and Escalation." *American Political Science Review* 91, 1 (March): 15-27.
- David Garnham (1976). "Power Parity and Lethal International Violence, 1969-1973." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 20, 3: 379-394.
- Woosang Kim (2002). "Power Parity, Alliance, Dissatisfaction and Wars in East Asia, 1860-1993." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46, 5 (October): 654-671.
- Cristina M. Molinari (2000). "Military Capabilities and Escalation: A Correction to Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow and Zorick." *American Political Science Review* 94, 2 (June): 425-427. [see also their reply in issue 94(2): 429]
- William Brian Moul (1988). "Balances of Power and the Escalation to War of Serious Disputes among the European Great Powers, 1815-1939: Some Evidence." *American Journal of Political Science* 32: 241-275.
- William Moul (2003). "Power Parity, Preponderance, and War between Great Powers." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 47, 4 (August): 468-489.

- Randolph Siverson and Michael Sullivan (1983). "The Distribution of Power and the Onset of War." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 27, 3: 473-494.

5. Thursday, Feb. 16: Rational Choice Approaches

Note that the research paper proposals are due today

A nice contrast to the previous two weeks' emphasis on broad structures involves the study of decisions by individual leaders. Rational choice entered into the mainstream study of international conflict due to the work of scholars like Bueno de Mesquita in the 1970s and 1980s, most notably with 1981's The War Trap and (with David Lalman) 1992's War and Reason, and the field has advanced greatly as additional scholars have incorporated rational choice in their own work. It should be noted that this week's topic could easily be split up across various other weeks' readings, since rational choice is more of a method for theorizing than a separate topic, and many of the readings throughout the semester use rational choice to help develop their theories.

Fearon's pathbreaking article considers when leaders could rationally start a war (a topic that has been the subject of debate over the years), while Powell expands on the commitment problem discussed by Fearon. Reiter discussed the bargaining model of war, which Werner and Yuen use to understand conflict recurrence, and Ramsay reviews additional research in this area. Siverson and Bueno de Mesquita use rational choice to try to understand conflict behavior, using their well-known "selectorate theory." Finally, Bell and Johnson use a rationalist model to exam the role of future expectations and preventive war. While reading each of these articles, try to focus on the basic structure of the author's model (what are leaders trying to achieve, and how/when/why can wars start as they try to do this?). Also consider the tests that are offered, if any (does the test seem to offer a fair and appropriate evaluation of the basic model? does the evidence leave you convinced that the model is useful?). Finally, think about what (if anything) rational choice has contributed to our understanding of these topics; have these models produced surprising hypotheses or new insights that might not have been revealed with traditional approaches, or have these articles basically amounted to much mathematical ado about nothing?

Required Readings:

Reviews:

- Dan Reiter (2003). "Exploring the Bargaining Model of War." *Perspectives on Politics* 1, 1 (March): 27-43
- Kristopher W. Ramsay (2017). "Information, Uncertainty, and War." *Annual Review of Political Science* 20: 505-527.
- Randolph M. Siverson and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita (2017). "The Selectorate Theory and International Politics." *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*.

Original Research:

- James D. Fearon (1995). "Rationalist Explanations for War." *International Organization*, 49: 379-414.
- Robert Powell (2006). "War as a Commitment Problem." *International Organization* 60 1: 169-203.
- Suzanne Werner and Amy Yuen (2005). "Making and Keeping Peace." *International Organization* 59, 2 (April): 261-292.
- Sam R. Bell and Jesse C. Johnson (2015). "Shifting Power, Commitment Problems, and Preventive War." *International Studies Quarterly* 59: 124-132.

Optional Readings:

- *Guide to SSIP*: chapter by Zagare and Slantchev (game theory/modeling)
- James D. Morrow and Jessica S. Sun (2020). "Models of Interstate Conflict." In Luigi Curini and Robert Franzese, *SAGE Handbook of Research Methods in Political Science and International Relations*. (Available online through UNT library)

Additional Readings:

- D. Scott Bennett and Allan Stam (2000). "A Universal Test of an Expected Utility Theory of War." *International Studies Quarterly* 44, 3: 451-480.
- Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce (1981). *The War Trap*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Bruce Bueno de Mesquita (1988). "The Contribution of Expected Utility Theory to the Study of International

Conflict." *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 18: 629-652.

- Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman (1992). *War and Reason*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow (2003). *The Logic of Political Survival*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alastair Smith (2004). "Testing Novel Implications from the Selectorate Theory of War." *World Politics* 56, 3: 363-388.
- Bruce Bueno de Mesquita (2006). "Game Theory, Political Economy, and the Evolving Study of War and Peace." *American Political Science Review* 100, 4 (November): 637-642.
- James D. Fearon (1998). "Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation." *International Organization* 52, 2 (Spring), 269-306.
- James D. Fearon (1997). "Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41, 1 (February), 68-90.
- Gartzke, Erik, and Paul Poast. 2018. "Empirically Assessing the Bargaining Theory of War: Potential and Challenges" *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*.
- James D. Morrow (1986). "A Spatial Model of International Conflict." *American Political Science Review* 80:1131-1150.
- James D. Morrow (1997). "A Rational Choice Approach to International Conflict." In Nehemiah Geva and Alex Mintz, eds., *Decisionmaking on War and Peace: The Cognitive-Rational Debate*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 11-31.
- Robert Powell (2002). "Bargaining Theory and International Conflict." *Annual Review of Political Science* 5: 1-30.
- Alastair Smith (1995). "Alliance Formation and War." *International Studies Quarterly* 39: 405-425.
- Alastair Smith (1996). "To Intervene or Not to Intervene: A Biased Decision." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 40, 1 (March): 16-40.
- Alastair Smith (1996). "Diversionary Foreign Policy in Democratic Systems." *International Studies Quarterly* 40, 1 (March): 133-153.
- Alastair Smith (1999). "Testing Theories of Strategic Choice: The Example of Crisis Escalation." *American Journal of Political Science* 43, 4 (October): 1254-1283.
- Ahmer Tarar (2006). "Diversionary Incentives and the Bargaining Approach to War." *International Studies Quarterly* 50 (1): 169-188.
- Stephen M. Walt (1999). "Rigor or Rigor Mortis? Rational Choice and Security Studies." *International Security*, 23(4): 5-48. See also replies by Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Martin, Niou, Ordeshook, Powell, and Zagare in *International Security*, Volume 24(2), Fall 1999.

6. Thursday, Feb. 23: Psychological Approaches

Another important contrast comes from comparing the rational choice approaches from last week with work suggesting that psychological issues can prevent truly rational decision-making. This approach is embodied most prominently in academic research on misperception and on "prospect theory," although some of the additional readings listed below have gone beyond these two areas. If this approach is correct, then rational choice models of decision-making (as well as other approaches that implicitly depend on rationality) might be flawed, and any understanding of conflict based on such models might be incomplete or misleading.

Levy's articles and the Goldgeier and Tetlock review discuss how our understanding of the causes of war could be improved by considering misperception and prospect theory, a psychologically based challenge to traditional rational choice approaches. Much of the work on both prospect theory and misperception, though, has been based on either psychological laboratory studies or on intensive analyses of individual cases. Herek et al., Kaufmann, and Kim and Bueno de Mesquita all suggest different ways that these types of studies can be applied in larger-N analyses of conflict patterns. Does any of these three approaches offer a convincing way to evaluate the impact of psychological processes on conflict (and if not, why not)? Is there anything that they have left out that needs to be studied or anything that you feel has not been done convincingly, and if so, how would you propose to improve the literature?

Required Readings:

Reviews:

- J.M. Goldgeier and P.E. Tetlock (2001). "Psychology and International Relations Theory." *Annual Review of Political Science* 4: 67-92.

Original Research:

- Jack S. Levy (1983). "Misperception and the Causes of War: Theoretical Linkages and Analytical Problems." *World Politics* 36: 76-99.
- Robert Jervis (2017). *How Statesmen Think: The Psychology of International Politics*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Chapter 4 ("Prospect Theory: The Political Implications of Loss Aversion").
- Alex Mintz (2004). "How Do Leaders Make Decisions? A Poliheuristic Perspective." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48, 1: 3-13.
- Gregory M. Herek, Irving L. Janis, and Paul K. Huth (1987). "Decision Making During International Crises: Is Quality of Process Related to Outcome?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 203-226.
- Chaim D. Kaufmann (1994). "Out of the Lab and into the Archives: A Method for Testing Psychological Explanations of Political Decision Making." *International Studies Quarterly* 38: 557-586.

Optional Readings:

- Levy & Thompson: Chapter 5 ("Decision-Making: The Individual Level"), Chapter 6 ("Decision-Making: The Organizational Level")

Additional Readings:

- *Handbook of War Studies II*: chapter by Levy (prospect theory)
- William Boettcher (1995). "Context, Methods, Numbers, and Words: Prospect Theory in International Relations." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 39, 3L 561-583.
- Christopher K. Butler (2007). "Prospect Theory and Coercive Bargaining." *Journal Of Conflict Resolution* 51, 2 (April): 227-250.
- Nehemiah Geva and Alex Mintz, eds. (1997), *Decisionmaking on War and Peace: The Cognitive-Rational Debate*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Alexander L. George (1969). "The "Operational Code": A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making." *International Studies Quarterly* 190-222.
- Betty Glad (1990). *Psychological Dimensions of War*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- Margaret Hermann, Thomas Preston, Baghat Korany, and Timothy Shaw (2001). "Who Leads Matters: The Effects of Powerful Individuals" *International Studies Review*, 3, 2: 83-131
- Margaret Hermann (2001). "How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy: A Theoretical Framework" *International Studies Review*, 3, 2: 47-81.
- Irving L. Janis (1982). *Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes*. New York: Free Press.
- Irving L. Janis (1989). *Crucial Decisions*. New York: Free Press.
- Robert Jervis (1968). "Hypotheses on Misperception." *World Politics* 454-479.
- Robert Jervis (1976). *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Robert Jervis (1983). "Deterrence and Perception." *International Security* 57-83.
- Robert Jervis (1988). "War and Misperception." *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 18: 675-700.
- Robert Jervis (2017). *How Statesmen Think: The Psychology of International Politics*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Stein (1985). *Psychology and Deterrence*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins.
- Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (1979). "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk." *Econometrica* 263-291.
- Joshua D. Kertzer and Dustin Tinglery (2018). "Political Psychology in International Relations: Beyond the Paradigms." *Annual Review of Political Science* 21: 319-339.
- Woosang Kim and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita (1995). "How Perceptions Influence the Risk of War."

International Studies Quarterly. 39:51-65.

- Paul Kowert and Margaret Hermann (1997). "Who Takes Risks? Daring and Caution in Foreign Policy Making." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41, 5: 611-637.
- Richard Ned Lebow (1981). *Between Peace and War*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins.
- Jack S. Levy (1992). "Prospect Theory and International Relations: Theoretical Applications and Analytical Problems." *Political Psychology* 13:283-310.
- Jack Levy (1997). "Prospect Theory, Rational Choice, and International Relations." *International Studies Quarterly* 45, 2: 241-270.
- Alex Mintz ed. (2002). *Integrating Cognitive and Rational Theories of Foreign Policy Decision Making*. New York: Palgrave.
- George A. Quattrone and Amos Tversky (1988). "Contrasting Rational and Psychological Analyses of Political Choice." *American Political Science Review* 82:719-736.
- Graham H. Shepard (1988). "Personality Effects on American Foreign Policy, 1969-1984: A Second Test of Interpersonal Generalization Theory." *International Studies Quarterly* 32:91-123.
- Arthur Stein (1982). "When Misperception Matters." *World Politics* 505-526.
- Janice Gross Stein (1989). "The Misperception of Threat." In Robert Matthews, Arthur Rubinoff, and Janice Gross Stein, eds., *International Conflict and Conflict Management*, 2nd edition. Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall, pp. 30-44.
- Janice Gross Stein and David Welch (1997). "Rational and Psychological Approaches to the Study of International Conflict: Comparative Strengths and Weaknesses." In Nehemiah Geva and Alex Mintz (eds.), *Decisionmaking on War and Peace: The Cognitive-Rational Debate*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 51-77.
- Amos Tversky, and Daniel Kahneman (1981). "The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice." *Science* 453-458.
- Michael Young and Mark Schafer (1998). "Is There Method in Our Madness? Ways of Assessing Cognition in International Relations." *Mershon International Studies Review* 42, 1: 63-96.

7. Thursday, March 2: Arms Races and Conflict

The impact of arms races has spawned a long debate among scholars, which has lasted several decades and helped propel several careers. The seminal study of arms races and war came from Michael Wallace in 1979, and was quickly followed by a number of both theoretical and empirical challenges such as Diehl's article. Diehl and Kingston and Gibler et al. extended the study of arms races by looking at their possible impact on the initiation of armed conflict, rather than its escalation (as studied by Wallace and by the majority of other work in this area).

After a period of relative neglect, the study of arms races reemerged at the end of the 1990s as several scholars returned to the old debate. Work by such scholars as Sample and Gibler has tried to improve the empirical study of the arms race-conflict linkage, including both theory and research design, while Rider looks at the origins of the arms races themselves. Finally, Owsiak reviews the larger "steps to war" theory developed by Vasquez, putting arms races into a broader theoretical context. In reading this literature, one thing to consider (and a major emphasis of most of the past work) is the appropriateness of the various data sets and measures that are used. At least as important, though, think about this research theoretically. How (if at all) does each piece contribute theoretically to our potential understanding of arms races and conflict? What does each piece add to the literature, and how well is it supported by the empirical analyses that are conducted?

Required Readings:

Reviews:

- *What Do We Know About War?*, 3rd edition: chapter by Sample (arms races)
- Andrew P. Owsiak (2017). "The Steps to War: Theory and Evidence." *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*.

Original Research:

- Michael D. Wallace (1979). "Arms Races and Escalation: Some New Evidence." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*

23, 1: 3-16.

- Paul F. Diehl (1983). "Arms Races and Escalation: A Closer Look." *Journal of Peace Research* 20: 205-210.
- Paul F. Diehl and Jean Kingston (1987). "Messenger or Message? Military Buildups and the Initiation of Conflict." *Journal of Politics* 49, 4: 789-799.
- Douglas M. Gibler, Toby J. Rider, and Marc L. Hutchison (2005). "Taking Arms Against a Sea of Troubles: Conventional Arms Races During Periods of Rivalry." *Journal of Peace Research* 42, 2: 131-147.
- Toby J. Rider (2013). "Uncertainty, Salient Stakes and the Causes of Conventional Arms Races." *International Studies Quarterly* 57, 3: 580-591.

Optional Readings:

- Levy & Thompson: Chapter 3 ("The Dyadic Interactions of States"): "Steps to War" section

Additional Readings:

- Note that this list covers empirical research on arms races and war, but does not include the vast literature on formal/dynamic models of arms races.
- Michael F. Altfeld (1983). "Arms Races? And Escalation? A Comment on Wallace." *International Studies Quarterly*, 27(2): 225-231. See also Wallace's reply "Arms Races and Escalation---A Reply to Altfeld" in the same issue.
- Sean Bolks and Richard J. Stoll (2000). "The Arms Acquisition Process: The Effect of Internal and External Constraints on Arms Race Dynamics." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 44(5): 580-603.
- Paul F. Diehl (1985). "Arms Races to War: Testing Some Empirical Linkages." *The Sociological Quarterly*, 26: 331-349.
- Paul F. Diehl (1985). "Armaments without War: An Analysis of Some Underlying Effects." *Journal of Peace Research* 22: 249-259.
- Paul F. Diehl and Mark J. C. Crescenzi (1998). "Reconfiguring the Arms Race-War Debate." *Journal of Peace Research* 35, 1: 111-118. See also Wallace's 1998 reply "Comments on the Articles by Sample and Diehl & Crescenzi" (*Journal of Peace Research* 35, 1: 119-121).
- Charles Glaser (1997). "The Security Dilemma Revisited." *World Politics*, 50, 1: 171-201.
- Charles Glaser (2000). "The Causes and Consequences of Arms Races." *Annual Review of Political Science* 3: 251-276.
- Andrew Kydd (1997). "Game Theory and the Spiral Model." *World Politics* 49, 3 (April).
- Andrew Kydd (2000). "Arms Races and Arms Control: Modeling the Hawk Perspective." *American Journal of Political Science* 44, 2 (April).
- James D. Morrow (1989). "A Twist of Truth: A Reexamination of the Effects of Arms Races on the Occurrence of War." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 33, 3: 500-529.
- Ido Oren (1998). "A Theory of Armament." *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 16(1): 1-29.
- Lewis Fry Richardson (1960). *Arms and Insecurity*. Pittsburgh: Boxwood Press.
- Toby J. Rider (2009). "Understanding Arms Race Onset: Rivalry, Threat, and Territorial Competition." *Journal of Politics* 71, 2: 693-703.]
- Toby J. Rider, Michael G. Findley, and Paul F. Diehl (2011). "Just Part of the Game? Arms Races, Rivalry, and War." *Journal of Peace Research* 48, 1: 85-100.
- Susan G. Sample (1997). "Arms Races and Dispute Escalation: Resolving the Debate." *Journal of Peace Research*, 34(1): 7-22.
- Susan G. Sample (1998). "Military Buildups, War, and Realpolitik: A Multivariate Model." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42, 2: 156-175.
- Susan G. Sample (1998). "Furthering the Investing into the Effects of Arms Buildups." *Journal of Peace Research* 35 (1): 122-126. See also Wallace's 1998 reply "Comments on the Articles by Sample and Diehl & Crescenzi" (*Journal of Peace Research* 35, 1: 119-121).
- Susan G. Sample (2002). "The Outcomes of Military Buildups: Minor States vs. Major Powers." *Journal of Peace Research* 39, 6 (November): 669-691
- J. David Singer (1958). "Threat-Perception and the Armament-Tension Dilemma." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 2:90-115.

- Theresa Clair Smith (1988). "Risky Races? Curvature Change and the War Risk in Arms Racing." *International Interactions* 14(3): 201-228.
- Michael D. Wallace (1981). "Old Nails in New Coffins: The Para Bellum Hypothesis Revisited." *Journal of Peace Research*, 18: 91-95.
- Michael D. Wallace (1982). "Armaments and Escalation: Two Competing Hypotheses." *International Studies Quarterly* 26(1): 37-56.
- Erich Weede (1980). "Arms Races and Escalation: Some Persisting Doubts." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 24(2): 285-287. See also Wallace's 1980 reply "Some Persistent Findings: A Reply to Professor Weede" (*Journal of Conflict Resolution* 24, 2: 289-292).
- Suzanne Werner and Jacek Kugler (1996). "Power Transitions and Military Buildups: Resolving the Relationship Between Arms Races and War." In Kugler and Lemke, (eds.). *Parity and War*, pp. 187-207.

8. Thursday, March 9: Deterrence, Bargaining, and Crisis Escalation

Note that the research designs are due today

Deterrence is a better application of the realist "para bellum" doctrine than the arms race literature from last week that also discussed this doctrine, with very clear policy relevance. Although the subject of deterrence received considerable attention from both scholars and leaders during the Cold War, it did not become the subject of frequent quantitative analyses until the 1980s; Quackenbush reviews the extensive literature that ensued. Huth offered the best quantitative assessment of immediate deterrence theory up to that point in time, although Lebow and Stein challenge his approach, and Fearon tests a somewhat different theoretical model. Huth and Russett, Johnson et al., and Morrow attempt to study the much more difficult topic of general deterrence, where the set of cases is not as clear. Finally, Gartzke and Kroenig focus specifically on the impact of nuclear weapons, a subject that comes up in some of the earlier articles.

When reading these articles, consider each one in relation to the work that has come before. Has each article advanced the field? Does each article offer an appropriate test of deterrence/crisis bargaining theory? How could each article be improved?

Required Readings:

Reviews:

- *What Do We Know About War?*, 3rd edition: chapters by Kenwick and McManus (deterrence and alliances), Fuhrmann (nuclear weapons)
- Stephen Quackenbush (2018). "Empirical Analyses of Deterrence." *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*.

Original Research:

- Paul K. Huth (1988). "Extended Deterrence and the Outbreak of War." *American Political Science Review* 82, 2: 423-443.
- Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Stein (1990). "Deterrence: the Elusive Dependent Variable." *World Politics* 42, 3: 336-369.
- James D. Fearon (1994). "Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests: An Empirical Test of a Crisis Bargaining Model." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 38, 2: 236-269.
- Paul K. Huth and Bruce Russett (1993). "General Deterrence Between Enduring Rivals: Testing Three Competing Models." *American Political Science Review*, 87: 61-73.
- Jesse C. Johnson, Brett Ashley Leeds, and Ahra Wu (2015). "Capability, Credibility, and Extended General Deterrence." *International Interactions* 41: 309-336.
- James D. Morrow (2016). "When Do Defensive Alliances Provoke Rather than Deter?" *Journal of Politics* 79, 1: 341-345.

Optional Readings:

- Levy & Thompson: Chapter 3 ("The Dyadic Interactions of States"): "Bargaining Model" section

Additional Readings:

• Note that this list covers empirical research on deterrence and war, but does not include much of the vast literature on formal models of deterrence or policy-based analyses.

Deterrence

- Christopher Achen and Duncan Snidal (1989). "Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies." *World Politics*, 41: 143-169.
- Brett Benson (2011). "Unpacking Alliances: Deterrent and Compellent Alliances and Their Relationship with Conflict." *Journal of Politics* 73, 4: 1111-1127.
- Vesna Danilovic (2001). "Conceptual and Selection Bias Issues in Deterrence." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45(1): 97-125.
- Vesna Danilovic (2001). "The Sources of Threat Credibility in Extended Deterrence." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 45, 3: 341-369.
- George W. Downs (1989). "The Rational Deterrence Debate." *World Politics* 225-237.
- Darren Filson and Suzanne Werner (2002). "A Bargaining Model of War and Peace: Anticipating the Onset, Duration, and Outcome of War." *American Journal of Political Science* 46, 4 (October): 819-837
- Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke (1989). "Deterrence and Foreign Policy." *World Politics* 170-182.
- Keith A. Grant (2012). "Outsourcing Security: Alliance Portfolio Size, Capability, and Reliability." *International Studies Quarterly* 57,2: 418-429.
- Harvey, Frank P. (1998). "Rigor Mortis, or Rigor, More Tests: Necessity, Sufficiency, and Deterrence Logic." *International Studies Quarterly*, 42(4): 675-707.
- Paul K. Huth (1988). *Extended Deterrence and The Prevention of War*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Paul K. Huth (1996). "When Do States Take on Extended Deterrent Commitments?: Cases from 1885 to 1994." in Frank W. Wayman and Paul F. Diehl, eds., *Reconstructing Realpolitik*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Paul K. Huth (1998). "Major Power Intervention in International Crises, 1918-1988." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 42(6): 744-770.
- Paul K. Huth "Deterrence and International Conflict" *Annual Review of Political Science* vol. 2: 25-48.
- Paul K. Huth and Bruce Russett (1984). "What Makes Deterrence Work: Cases From 1900 to 1980." *World Politics*, 36: 496-526.
- Paul K. Huth and Bruce Russett (1990). "Testing Deterrence Theory: Rigor Makes a Difference." *World Politics* 42:466-501.
- Paul K. Huth, Christopher Gelpi, and D. Scott Bennett (1993). "The Escalation of Great Power Militarized Disputes: Testing Rational Deterrence Theory and Structural Realism." *American Political Science Review*, 87(3): 609-623.
- JRobert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Stein (1985). *Psychology and Deterrence*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins. Chapter 3.
- Jacek Kugler and Frank C. Zagare, eds. (1987). *Exploring the Stability of Deterrence*. Boulder: Rienner.
- Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein (1989). "Rational Deterrence Theory: I Think, Therefore I Deter." *World Politics* 208-224.
- Jack S. Levy (1988). "When do Deterrent Threats Work?" *British Journal of Political Science*, 18: 485-512.
- Jack S. Levy (1989). "Quantitative Studies of Deterrence Success and Failure," in Paul C. Stern, et al, (eds.), *Perspectives on Deterrence*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Michaela Mattes and Greg Vonnahme (2010). "Contracting for Peace: Do Nonaggression Pacts Reduce Conflict?" *Journal of Politics* 72, 4; 925-938.
- John Mearsheimer (1983). *Conventional Deterrence*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- John Orme (1987). "Deterrence Failures: A Second Look." *International Security* 96-124.
- Stephen L. Quackenbush (2010). "General Deterrence and International Conflict: Testing Perfect Deterrence Theory." *International Interactions* 36, 1: 60-85.
- Bruce M. Russett (1963). "The Calculus of Deterrence." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 7, 2 (June): 97-109.
- Thomas C. Schelling (1966). *Arms and Influence*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Thomas C. Schelling (1960). *The Strategy of Conflict*. Harvard University Press.
- Smith, Alastair (1998). "Extended Deterrence and Alliance Formation." *International Interactions*, 24(4): 315-343.

- Thorin M. Wright and Toby J. Rider (2014). "Disputed Territory, Defensive Alliances, and Conflict Initiation." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 31, 2: 119-144.
- Frank C. Zagare (1996). "Classical Deterrence Theory: A Critical Assessment." *International Interactions*, 21(4): 365-387.
- Frank C. Zagare (1990). "Rationality and Deterrence." *World Politics* 42, 2 (January): 238-260.

Nuclear Deterrence

- *What Do We Know About War?*, 2nd edition: chapter by Geller (nuclear weapons)
- Kyle Beardsley and Victor Asal (2009). "Nuclear Weapons as Shields." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 26, 3: 235-255.
- Kyle Beardsley and Victor Asal (2009). "Winning with the Bomb." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53, 2: 278-301.
- Matthew Fuhrmann and Todd S. Sechser (2014). "Signaling Alliance Commitments: Hand-Tying and Sunk Costs in Extended Nuclear Deterrence." *American Journal of Political Science* 58, 4: 919-935.
- Erik Gartzke and Dong-Joon Jo (2009). "Bargaining, Nuclear Proliferation, and Interstate Disputes." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53, 2: 209-233.
- Erik Gartzke and Matthew Kroenig (2016). "Nukes with Numbers: Empirical Research on the Consequences of Nuclear Weapons for International Conflict." *Annual Review of Political Science* 19: 397-412.
- Daniel Geller (1990). "Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Crisis Escalation." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 34, 2 : 291-310.
- Paul K. Huth (1990). "The Extended Deterrent Value of Nuclear Weapons." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 34:270-290.
- Robert Powell (1987). "Crisis Bargaining, Escalation, and MAD." *American Political Science Review* 717-735.
- Robert Powell (1988). "Nuclear Brinkmanship with Two-Sided Incomplete Information." *American Political Science Review* 155-178.
- Scott D. Sagan (1985). "Nuclear Alerts and Crisis Management." *International Security* 99-139.
- David Sobek, Dennis M. Foster, and Samuel B. Robison (2012). "Conventional Wisdom? The Effect of Nuclear Proliferation on Armed Conflict, 1945-2001." *International Studies Quarterly* 56, 1: 149-162.

Crisis Bargaining / Escalation

- *Handbook of War Studies II*: chapter by Wilkenfeld & Brecher (interstate crises)
- Michael Brecher and Patrick James (1988). "Patterns of Crisis Management." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 32:426-456.
- Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James D. Morrow, and Ethan Zorick (1997). "Capabilities, Perception, and Escalation." *American Political Science Review* 91, 1: 15-27.
- Joe Clare (2007). "Domestic Audiences and Strategic Interests." *Journal of Politics* 69 (3): 732-745.
- Charles S. Gochman and Russell J. Leng (1983). "Realpolitik and the Road to War: An Analysis of Attributes and Behavior." *International Studies Quarterly* 27, 1 (March): 97-120.
- Shuhei Kurizaki (2007). "Efficient Secrecy: Public versus Private Threats in Crisis Diplomacy." *American Political Science Review* 101, 3 (August): 543-558.
- Russell J. Leng and Hugh G. Wheeler (1979). "Influence Strategies, Success, and War." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 23, 4 (December): 655-684.
- Russell J. Leng and Charles S. Gochman (1982). "Dangerous Disputes: A Study of Conflict Behavior and War." *American Journal of Political Science* 26, 4. (November): 664-687.
- Russell J. Leng (1983). "When Will They Ever Learn? Coercive Bargaining in Recurrent Crises." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 27(3): 379-419.
- Russell J. Leng 1984). "Reagan and the Russians: Crisis Bargaining Beliefs and the Historical Record." *American Political Science Review* 338-355.
- Russell J. Leng (1988). "Crisis Learning Games." *American Political Science Review* 82:179-194.
- Russell J. Leng (1993). "Reciprocating Influence Strategies in Interstate Crisis Bargaining." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 37(1): 3-41.
- Russell J. Leng (1993). *Interstate Crisis Behavior, 1816-1980: Realism vs. Reciprocity*. Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press.

- Russell Leng chapter in John Vasquez, ed. (2000), *What Do We Know About War? (1st edition)*.
- Russell J. Leng (2000). *Bargaining and Learning in Recurrent Crises: The Soviet-American, Egyptian-Israeli, and Indo-Pakistani Rivalries*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- T. Clifton Morgan (1984). "A Spatial Model of Crisis Bargaining." *International Studies Quarterly* 28:407-426.
- James D. Morrow (1989). "Capabilities, Uncertainty, and Resolve: A Limited Information Model of Crisis Bargaining." *American Journal of Political Science*, 33(4): 941-972.
- Robert Powell (1999). *In the Shadow of Power*. Princeton.
- Thomas C. Schelling (1980). *The Strategy of Conflict*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Branislav L. Slantchev (2003). "The Power to Hurt: Costly Conflict with Completely Informed States." *American Political Science Review* 97, 1 (February): 107-121.
- Branislav L. Slantchev (2005). "Military Coercion in Interstate Crises." *American Political Science Review* 99, 4 (November): 533-547.
- Branislav L. Slantchev (2006). "Politicians, the Media, and Domestic Audience Costs." *International Studies Quarterly* 50 (2): 445-477.
- Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing (1977). *Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making and System Structure in International Crises*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chapter 3.
- Robert Harrison Wagner (2000). "Bargaining and War." *American Journal of Political Science*. 44(3): 469-484.

9. Thursday, March 16: NO CLASS (Spring Break)

10. Thursday, March 23: Liberal Peace I: Democracy

No topic in the study of conflict has received more scholarly attention in the past several decades than the so-called "democratic peace." What began in the 1970s and early 1980s with the simple observation that political democracies rarely if ever fight wars against each other has spawned thousands of books, articles, and working papers. Portions of this work has attempted to determine whether the democratic peace applies in different spatial-temporal domains, whether democracies behave differently with regard to other dependent variables besides war, why democracies seem to behave differently, and whether the apparent democratic peace can actually be explained by some other factor(s).

This week's readings address the pacific nature of democracy itself. Munck and Verkuilen offer a conceptualization of democracy and compare how widely used data sets measure the concept. The Maoz & Russett article was one of the most influential works in the topic's early days as it was just reaching prominence. Bueno de Mesquita et al. offer a different approach to the topic, while Bennett and Weeks both address a possible broadening of the relationship between regime type and peace. Orsun et al. examine the critique that democratization is an especially dangerous time before democracy is safely consolidated, while Mitchell summarizes evidence on the normative side of democracy and Gibler presents a more recent challenge in the form of a "territorial peace." Consider for each reading how convincing the theory is, as well as how appropriate (and how convincing) the empirical analyses are. Are you convinced that democracy is associated with peace, and that these authors understand why? If not, why not?

Required Readings:

Reviews:

- *What Do We Know About War*, 3rd edition: chapter by Gibler (territorial peace)

Original Research:

- Gerardo L. Munck and Jay Verkuilen (2002). "Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: Evaluating Alternative Indices." *Comparative Political Studies* 35, 1 (February): 5-34.
- Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett (1993). "Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace." *American Political Science Review* 87: 624-38.
- Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alastair Smith (1999). "An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace." *American Political Science Review* 93 (4): 791-807.

- D. Scott Bennett (2006). "Toward a Continuous Specification of the Democracy-Autocracy Connection." *International Studies Quarterly* 50 (2): 313–338.
- Jessica L. Weeks (2012). "Strongmen and Straw Men: Authoritarian Regimes and the Initiation of International Conflict." *American Political Science Review* 106, 2: 326-347.
- Omer Faruk Orsun, Resat Bayer, and Michael Bernhard (2017). "Democratization and Conflict." *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*.

Optional Readings:

- *Guide to SSIP*: chapter by Chan (democratic peace)
- Levy & Thompson: Chapter 4 ("The State and Societal Level")

Additional Readings:

Democracy and Armed Conflict

- Lars-Erik Cederman (2001). "Modeling the Democratic Peace as a Kantian Selection Process." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45/4 (August): 470-502
- David H. Clark and Timothy Nordstrom (2005). "Democratic Variants and Democratic Variance: How Domestic Constraints Shape Interstate Conflict ." *Journal of Politics* 67, 1 (Feb.): 250-270
- Mark J. C. Crescenzi and Andrew J. Enterline (1999). "Ripples from the Waves? A Systemic, Time-Series Analysis of Democracy, Democratization, and Interstate War." *Journal of Peace Research*, 36(1): 75-94.
- Michael Doyle (1983). "Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs." *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 12: 205-235 (part I) and 323-53 (part II)
- Michael Doyle (1986). "Liberalism and World Politics." *American Political Science Review*, 80: 1151-1170.
- Henry S. Farber and Joanne Gowa (1997). "Common Interests or Common Polities? Reinterpreting the Democratic Peace." *Journal of Politics*, 59(2): 393-417.
- Erik Gartzke (1998). "Kant We All Just Get Along? Opportunity, Willingness, and the Origins of the Democratic Peace." *American Journal of Political Science*, 42(1): 1-27.
- Scott Gates, Torbjorn Knutsen, and Jonathon Moses (1996). "Democracy and Peace: A More Skeptical View." *Journal of Peace Research*, 33: 1-10.
- Kurt Taylor Gaubatz (1996). "Kant, Democracy, and History." *Journal of Democracy*, 7: 136-150.
- Nils Petter Gleditsch (1992). "Democracy and Peace." *Journal of Peace Research*, 29: 369-376.
- Nils Petter Gleditsch (1995). "Geography, Democracy, and Peace." *International Interactions*, 20: 297-323.
- Nils Petter Gleditsch and Håvard Hegre (1997). "Peace and Democracy: Three Levels of Analysis." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 41(2): 283-310.
- Joe Hagan (1994). "Domestic Political Systems and War Proneness." *Mershon International Studies Review*, 38, 2: 183-207.
- Paul R. Hensel, Gary Goertz, and Paul F. Diehl (2000). "The Democratic Peace and Rivalries." *Journal of Politics* 62, 4 (November): 1173-1188.
- Margaret G. Hermann and Charles W. Kegley, Jr. (1996). "Ballots, a Barrier against the Use of Bullets and Bombs: Democratization and Military Intervention." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 40(3): 436-460.
- Margaret G. Hermann and Charles W. Kegley, Jr. (2001). "Democracies and Interventions: Is There a Danger Zone in the Democratic Peace?" *Journal of Peace Research* 38/2 (March): 237-245
- Paul K. Huth and Todd Allee (2002). *The Democratic Peace and Territorial Conflict in the Twentieth Century*. ch. 1, 4-8.
- Michael J. Ireland and Scott Sigmund Gartner (2001). "Time to Fight: Government Type and Conflict Initiation in Parliamentary Systems." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 45(5): 547-568.
- Arie M. Kacowicz (1995). "Explaining Zones of Peace: Democracies as Satisfied Powers?" *Journal of Peace Research*, 32: 265-276.
- Kelly M. Kadera, Mark J. C. Crescenzi, and Megan L. Shannon. 2003. "Democratic Survival, Peace, and War in the International System." *American Journal of Political Science* 47/2 (April): 234-247
- Charles W. Kegley and Margaret G. Hermann (1995). "Military Intervention and the Democratic Peace." *International Interactions*, 21(1): 1-21.
- Charles W. Kegley and Margaret G. Hermann (1996). "How Democracies Use Intervention: A Neglected

Dimension in Studies of the Democratic Peace." *Journal of Peace Research*,33(3): 309-322.

- Christopher Layne (1994). "Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace." *International Security*, 19: 5-49.
- Douglas Lemke and William Reed (1996). "Regime Types and Status Quo Evaluations: Power Transition Theory and the Democratic Peace." *International Interactions*, 22: 143-164.
- Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder (2002). "Democratic Transitions, Institutional Strength, and War." *International Organization* 56, 2 (Spring): 297-337
- Zeev Maoz (1988). "Realist and Cultural Critiques of the Democratic Peace: A Theoretical and Empirical Reassessment." *International Interactions*, 24(1): 1-90.
- Zeev Maoz (1997). *Domestic Sources of Global Change*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Zeev Maoz and Nasrin Abdolali (1989). "Regime Types and International Conflict, 1816-1976." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 33: 3-35.
- Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett (1992). "Alliance, Contiguity, Wealth, and Political Stability: Is the Lack of Conflict Among Democracies a Statistical Artifact?" *International Interactions*,17:245-267.
- Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, Scott Gates and Håvard Hegre (1999). "Evolution in Democracy-War Dynamics." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 43(6): 771-792.
- T. Clifton Morgan and Sally Howard Campbell (1991). "Domestic Structure, Decisional Constraints and War." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 35: 187-211.
- T. Clifton Morgan and Valerie L. Schwabach (1992). "Take Two Democracies and Call Me in the Morning." *International Interactions*, 17: 305-320.
- Brandon C. Prins and Christopher Sprecher (1999). "Institutional Constraints, Political Opposition, and Interstate Dispute Escalation: Evidence from Parliamentary Systems, 1946-89." *Journal of Peace Research*, 36(3): 271-287.
- Arvid Raknerud and Håvard Hegre (1997). "The Hazard of War: Reassessing the Evidence of the Democratic Peace." *Journal of Peace Research*, 34(4): 385-404.
- Hilde Ravlo, Nils Petter Gleditsch, and Han Dorussen (2003). "Colonial War and the Democratic Peace." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 47/4 (August): 520-545
- James Lee Ray (1995). *Democracy and International Conflict: An Evaluation of the Democratic Peace Proposition*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
- Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam. 2003. "Identifying the Culprit: Democracy, Dictatorship, and Dispute Initiation." *American Political Science Review* 97/2 (May): 333-337
- Sebastian Rosato (2003). "The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory." *American Political Science Review* 97, 4 (November): 585– 602. See also responses by Kinsella, Slantchev-Alexandrova-Gartzke, and others in APSR vol 99 (2005), issue 3.
- R.J. Rummel (1985). "Libertarian Propositions on Violence Within and Between Nations." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 29: 419-455.
- R.J. Rummel (1995). "Democracies ARE Less Warlike Than Other Regimes." *European Journal of International Relations*, 1: 457-479.
- Bruce Russett (1993). *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Bruce Russett and John Oneal (2001). *Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Kenneth A. Schultz (1999). "Do Democratic Institutions Constrain or Inform? Contrasting Two Institutional Perspectives on Democracy and War." *International Organization*, 53(2): 233-266.
- Kenneth A. Schultz (2001). "Looking for Audience Costs." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 45(1): 32-60.
- Kenneth A. Schultz *Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Paul D. Senese (1997). "Between Dispute and War: The Effect of Joint Democracy on Interstate Conflict Escalation." *Journal of Politics*, 59(1): 1-27.
- Melvin Small and J. David Singer. (1976). "The War-Proneness of Democratic Regimes, 1816-1965." *The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations* 1:50-69.
- Harvey Starr (1997). "Democracy and Integration: Why Democracies Don't Fight Each Other." *Journal of Peace Research*, 34(2): 153-162.

- William R. Thompson (1996). "Democracy and Peace: Putting the Cart Before the Horse?" *International Organization*, 50: 141-174.
- William R. Thompson and Richard Tucker (1997). "A Tale of Two Democratic Peace Critiques." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 41, 3: 428-454.
- John A. Tures (2002). "The Dearth of Jointly Dyadic Democratic Interventions." *International Studies Quarterly* 46/4 (December): 579-589
- Douglas A. Van Belle (1997). "Press Freedom and the Democratic Peace." *Journal of Peace Research*, 34(4): 405-414.

Democratization and Armed Conflict

- Andrew J. Enterline (1996). "Driving While Democratizing (DWD)." *International Security*, 20: 183-196.
- Andrew J. Enterline (1998). "Regime Changes, Neighborhoods, and Interstate Conflict, 1816-1992." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 42(6): 804-829.
- Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder. (1995). "Democratization and the Danger of War." *International Security*, 30: 5-38.
- Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder. (2002). "Incomplete Democratization and the Outbreak of Military Disputes." *International Studies Quarterly* 46/4 (December): 529-549
- I. Benjamin Miller (2012). "Does Democratization Pacify the State? The Cases of Germany and Iraq." *International Studies Quarterly* 56, 3: 455-469.
- Demet Yalcin Mousseau (2001). "Democratizing with Ethnic Divisions: A Source of Conflict?" *Journal of Peace Research* 38/5 (September): 547-567
- Jack Snyder (2000). *From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Violence*. (New York: W. W. Norton).
- Michael D. Ward and Kristian S. Gleditsch (1998). "Democratizing for Peace." *American Political Science Review*, 92(1): 51-61.

Territorial Peace

- Douglas M. Gibler (2007). "Bordering on Peace: Democracy, Territorial Issues, and Conflict." *International Studies Quarterly* 51: 509-532.
- (more coming soon)

Considering Variation among Authoritarian States

- Mark Peceny, Caroline C. Beer, and Shannon Sanchez-Terry (2002). "Dictatorial Peace?" *American Political Science Review* 96:15-26.
- (more coming soon)

Democracy and Other Phenomena

- William Bernhard and David Leblang (2002). "Democratic Processes, Political Risk, and Foreign Exchange Markets." *American Journal of Political Science* 46/2 (April): 316-333
- William J. Dixon (1993). "Democracy and the Management of International Conflict." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 37(1): 42-68.
- William J. Dixon (1994). "Democracy and the Peaceful Settlement of International Conflict." *American Political Science Review*, 88: 14-32.
- William J. Dixon and Paul D. Senese (2002). "Democracy, Disputes, and Negotiated Settlements." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46/4 (August): 547-571
- Kurt Taylor Gaubatz (1996). "Democratic States and Commitment in International Relations." *International Organization*, 50: 109-139.
- Brett Ashley Leeds (1999). "Domestic Political Institutions, Credible Commitments, and International Cooperation." *American Journal of Political Science*, 43(4): 979-1002.
- Brett Ashley Leeds and David R. Davis (1999). "Beneath the Surface: Regime Type and International Interaction, 1953-78." *Journal of Peace Research*, 36(1): 5-21.
- Quan Li and Adam Resnick (2003). "Reversal of Fortunes: Democratic Institutions and Foreign Direct

Investment Inflows to Developing Countries.” *International Organization* 57/1 (Winter): 175-211

- Edward D. Mansfield, Helen V. Milner, and B. Peter Rosendorff (2002). “Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements.” *International Organization* 56/3 (Summer): 477-513
- Michael Mousseau (1997). “Democracy and Militarized Interstate Collaboration.” *Journal of Peace Research*, 34(1): 73-87.
- Michael Mousseau (1998). “Democracy and Compromise in Militarized Interstate Conflicts.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 42(2): 210-230.
- Jon C. Pevehouse (2002). “Democracy from the Outside-In? International Organizations and Democratization.” *International Organization* 56/3 (Summer): 515-549
- Dennis P. Quinn and John T. Woolley (2001). “Democracy and National Economic Performance: The Preference for Stability.” *American Journal of Political Science* 45/3 (July): 634-657
- Gregory A. Raymond (1994). “Democracies, Disputes, and Third-Party Intermediaries.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 38: 24-42.
- Gregory A. Raymond (1996). “Demosthenes and Democracies: Regime Type and Arbitration Outcomes.” *International Interactions*, 22: 1-20.
- Kenneth Schultz and Barry Weingast (2003). “The Democratic Advantage: Institutional Foundations of Financial Power in International Competition.” *International Organization* 57/1 (Winter): 3-42
- Harvey Starr (1991). “Democratic Dominoes: Diffusion Approaches to the Spread of Democracy in the International System.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 35, 2: 356-381.

11. Thursday, March 30: Liberal Peace II: Trade and Institutions

This week's readings extend beyond last week's by considering whether there is a broader "Kantian" or "liberal" peace, which either supplements/reinforces or supplants/replaces the democratic peace. One important body of literature in this vein examines trade and interdependence -- reflected here in an influential article by Oneal and Russett and a later contribution by Gartzke et al. Other work addresses economic systems (Gartzke) and international institutions (Pevehouse & Russett, Anderson et al.). Chang and Kastner review this body of work, and Hegre seeks to reevaluate the impact of democracy in light of many of these challenges.

Consider for each reading how convincing the theory is, as well as how appropriate (and how convincing) the empirical analyses are. Are you convinced that economic factors and/or institutions are associated with peace, and that these authors understand why? If not, why not? Based on this evidence, are you convinced that these factors replace or supplement the democratic peace (as some authors contend), or do they primarily reinforce or strengthen their effect of democracy?

Required Readings:

Reviews:

- *What Do We Know About War*, 3rd edition: chapter by Mousseau (liberal peace)
- Havard Hegre (2014). “Democracy and Armed Conflict.” *Journal of Peace Research* 51, 2: 159-172.
- Hyo Joon Chang and Scott L. Kastner (2018). “Economic Interdependence and Conflict.” *Oxford Encyclopedia of Empirical International Relations Theory*.

Original Research:

- John R. Oneal and Bruce M. Russett (1999). “The Kantian Peace: The Pacific Benefits of Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, 1885-1992.” *World Politics* 52 (October): 1-37.
- Erik Gartzke, Quan Li, and Charles Boehmer (2001). “Economic Interdependence and International Conflict.” *International Organization* 55, 2 (Spring): 391-437.
- Erik Gartzke (2007). “The Capitalist Peace.” *American Journal of Political Science* 51 (1): 166–191.
- Jon Pevehouse and Bruce Russett (2006). “Democratic International Governmental Organizations Promote Peace.” *International Organization* 60, 4 (October): 969-1000.
- Christopher C. Anderson, Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, and Emily Schilling (2016). “Kantian Dynamics Revisited: Time Varying Analyses of Dyadic IGO-Conflict Relationships.” *International Interactions* 42(4): 644-676.

Optional Readings:

- Levy & Thompson: Chapter 3 ("The Dyadic Interactions of States"): "Economic Interdependence" section

Additional Readings:

- *Handbook of War Studies II*: chapter by Russett and Starr (Kantian peace)
- *Journal of Peace Research* special issue on trade and conflict: July 1999, 36(4).
- Charles H. Anderton and John R. Carter (2001). "The Impact of War on Trade: An Interrupted Times-Series Study." *Journal of Peace Research* 38, 4 (July): 445-457. See also responses by Barbieri and Levy ("Does War Impede Trade?" and by Anderton and Carter ("On Disruption of Trade by War."))
- Katherine Barbieri (1996). "Economic Interdependence: A Path to Peace or a Source of Interstate Conflict?" *Journal of Peace Research* 33: 29-49.
- Katherine Barbieri (2002). *The Liberal Illusion: Does Trade Promote Peace*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Katherine Barbieri and Jack S. Levy (1999). 'Sleeping with the Enemy: The Impact of War on Trade' , *Journal of Peace Research* 36(4): 463–479.
- Katherine Barbieri and Gerald Schneider (1999). "Globalization and Peace: Assessing New Directions in the Study of Trade and Conflict." *Journal of Peace Research*, 36, 4: 387-404.
- David H. Bearce (2003). "Grasping the Commercial Institutional Peace." *International Studies Quarterly* 47/3 (September): 347-370
- David H. Bearce and Eric O'N. Fisher (2002). "Economic Geography, Trade and War." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46/3 (June): 365-393
- Dale Copeland (1996). "Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade Expectations." *International Security*, 20, 4: 5-41.
- Vesna Danilovic and Joe Clare (2007). "The Kantian Liberal Peace (Revisited)." *American Journal of Political Science* 51 (2): 397–414.
- Michael S. De Vries (1990). "Interdependence, Cooperation, and Conflict: An Empirical Analysis." *Journal of Peace Research*, 27: 429-444.
- Han Dorussen (2002). "Trade and Conflict in Multi-Country Models: A Rejoinder." *Journal of Peace Research* 39/1 (January): 115-118
- Benjamin Fordham (1998). "The Politics of Threat Perception and the Use of Force: A Political Economy Model of US Uses of Force, 1949-1994." *International Studies Quarterly*, 42, 3: 567-590.
- Mark Gasiorowski (1986). "Economic Interdependence and International Conflict: Some Cross-National Evidence." *International Studies Quarterly*, 30: 23-38.
- Mark Gasiorowski and Solomon W. Polachek (1982). "Conflict and Interdependence." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 26: 709-729.
- Håvard Hegre (2000). "Development and the Liberal Peace: What Does it Take to be a Trading State?" *Journal of Peace Research* 37(1): 5–30.
- Håvard Hegre (2002). "Trade Decreases Conflict More in Multi-Actor Systems: A Comment on Dorussen." *Journal of Peace Research* 39/1 (January): 109-114.
- Håvard Hegre (2004). "Size Asymmetry, Trade, and Militarized Conflict." *Journal of Peace Research* 41(3): 403–429.
- Håvard Hegre (2005). "Identifying How Trade Matters in Empirical Studies of Interstate Conflict." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 22, 3 (October): 217-224. See also Erik Gartzke and Quan Li, "Mistaken Identity: A Reply to Hegre" (reply immediately following Hegre's article).
- Edward D. Mansfield (1994). *Power, Trade, and War*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Edward D. Mansfield and Brian Pollins (2001). "The Study of Interdependence and Conflict" *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 45, 6: 834-859.
- Edward D. Mansfield and Brian M. Pollins, eds. (2003). *Economic Interdependence and International Conflict: New Perspectives on an Enduring Debate*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press .
- McMillan, Susan M. (1997). "Interdependence and Conflict." *Mershon International Studies Review*, 41(1): 33-58.
- James D. Morrow (1999). "How Could Trade Affect Conflict?" *Journal of Peace Research* 36: 481- 489.

- Michael Mousseau (2000). "Market Prosperity, Democratic Consolidation, and Democratic Peace." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 44, 4: 472-507.
- John R. Oneal, Frances H. Oneal, Zeev Maoz, and Bruce M. Russett (1996). "The Liberal Peace: Interdependence, Democracy, and International Conflict, 1950-1985." *Journal of Peace Research*, 33: 11-28.
- John R. Oneal and Bruce M. Russett (1997). "The Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950-1985." *International Studies Quarterly*, 41: 267-294.
- John R. Oneal, Bruce M. Russett, and Michael L. Berbaum (2003). "Causes of Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, 1886-1992." *International Studies Quarterly* 47(3): 371-393.
- Jon C. Pevehouse (2004). "Interdependence Theory and the Measurement of International Conflict." *Journal of Politics* 66, 1: 247-266.
- Solomon W. Polachek (1980). "Conflict and Trade." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 24: 57-78.
- Brian R. Pollins (1989). "Does Trade Still Follow the Flag?" *American Political Science Review*, 83: 465-480.
- Brian R. Pollins (1989). "Conflict, Cooperation, and Commerce: The Effects of International Politics on Bilateral Trade Flows." *American Journal of Political Science*, 33: 737-761.
- Brian R. Pollins (1996). "Global Political Order, Economic Change, and Armed Conflict: Coevolving Systems and the Use of Force." *American Political Science Review*, 90, 1: 103-117.
- Rafael Reuveny and Heejoon Kang (1998). "Bilateral Trade and Political Conflict/Cooperation: Do Goods Matter?." *Journal of Peace Research* 35(5): 581-602.
- Bruce Russett, John R. Oneal, and David R. Davis (1998). "The Third Leg of the Kantian Tripod for Peace: International Organizations and Militarized Disputes, 1950-85." *International Organization* 52, 3 (Summer): 441-467.
- Gerald Schneider, Katherine Barbieri, and Nils Petter Gleditsch, eds. (2003) *Globalization and Armed Conflict*. Boulder: Rowman and Littlefield.

12. Thursday, April 6: Politics, Economics, and Other Domestic Pressures

Although the democratic peace has gotten the most scholarly attention, the last two decades have also seen the emergence of a large literature on other connections between domestic politics and international conflict. Much of this literature is related to the famous (but weakly supported) "diversionary theory" of conflict. Morgan and Bickers examine support in the president's own party. Leeds and Davis offer an alternative explanation based on strategic interaction that they test on a wider set of cases, and Mitchell/Prins and Haynes examine relations with a particular rival rather than general conflict propensities. Finally, Williams and Carter & Nordstrom focus on more specific details of the leader's political situation, and Fordham and reviews the extensive diversionary conflict literature.

In evaluating these readings, consider the impact that domestic pressures have on armed conflict. Are you convinced by the theoretical arguments? How about the empirical evidence? What could be done to improve these studies, or to extend this general body of research to areas that have not been covered yet?

Required Readings:

Reviews:

- Benjamin Fordham (2017). "More than Mixed Results: What We Have Learned from Quantitative Research on the Diversionary Hypothesis." *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*.
- *What Do We Know about War?*, 3rd edition: chapter by Wolford (leaders)

Original Research:

- T. Clifton Morgan and Kenneth N. Bickers (1992). "Domestic Discontent and the External Use of Force." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 36, 1: 25-52.
- Brett Ashley Leeds and David R. Davis (1997). "Domestic Political Vulnerability and International Disputes." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41, 6: 814-834.
- Sara McLaughlin Mitchell and Brandon C. Prins (2004). "Rivalry and Diversionary Uses of Force." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48: 937 - 961.
- Kyle Haynes (2016). "Diversity and Diversion: How Ethnic Composition Affects Diversionary Conflict."

International Studies Quarterly 60: 258-271.

- Laron K. Williams (2013). "Flexible Election Timing and International Conflict." *International Studies Quarterly* 57, 3: 449-461.
- Jeff Carter and Timothy Nordstrom (2017). "Term Limits, Leader Preferences, and Interstate Conflict." *International Studies Quarterly* 61: 721-735.

Optional Readings:

- *Guide to SSIP*: chapter by Moore and Tarar (domestic-international linkages)

Additional Readings:

- William D. Baker and John R. Oneal (2001). "Patriotism or Opinion Leadership? The Nature and Origins of the 'Rally Round the Flag' Effect." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 45(5):661-687.
- Matthew A. Baum (2002). "The Constituent Foundations of the Rally-Round-The-Flag Phenomenon." *International Studies Quarterly* 46/2 (June): 263-298
- Matthew A. Baum (2002). "Sex, Lies, and War: How Soft News Brings Foreign Policy to the Inattentive Public." *American Political Science Review* 96, 1 (March): 91-109
- Paul Brace and Barbara Hinckley (1992). *Follow the Leader: Opinion Polls and the Modern Presidents*. New York, New York: Basic Books.
- Bruce Bueno de Mesquita (2002). "Domestic Politics and International Relations." *International Studies Quarterly* 46/1 (March) 1-9
- Terrence L. Chapman (2009). "Audience Beliefs and International Organization Legitimacy." *International Organization* 63, 4: 733-764.
- Giacomo Chiozza and Hein E. Goemans (2003). "Peace through Insecurity: Tenure and International Conflict." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 47/4 (August): 443-467
- Graeme Davies (2002). "Domestic Strife and the Initiation of International Conflicts: A Directed Dyad Analysis, 1950-1982." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46, 5: 672-692.
- Karl R. DeRouen, Jr. (1995). "The Indirect Link: Politics, the Economy, and the Use of Force." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 39(4): 671-695.
- DeRouen, Jr. (2000). "Presidents and the Diversionary Use of Force: A Research Note." *International Studies Quarterly*, 44(2): 317-328.
- Matthew DiLorenzo, Becca McBride, and James Lee Ray (2016). "Presidential Political Ambition and U.S. Foreign Conflict Behavior 1816-2010." *Conflict Management and Peace Science*.
- James D. Fearon (1994). "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes." *American Political Science Review* 88: 577-592.
- Benjamin O. Fordham (1998). "Partisanship, Macroeconomic Policy, and U.S. Uses of Force, 1949-1994." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 42(4): 418-439.
- Benjamin O. Fordham (1998). "The Politics of Threat Perception and the Use of Force: A Political Economy Model of U.S. Uses of Force, 1949-1994." *International Studies Quarterly*, 42(3): 567-590.
- Benjamin O. Fordham (2002). "Another Look at 'Parties, Voters, and the Use of Force Abroad.'" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46/4 (August): 572-593
- Benjamin O. Fordham and Christopher C. Sarver (2001). "Militarized Interstate Disputes and United States Uses of Force." *International Studies Quarterly*, 45(3): 455-466.
- Scott Sigmund Gartner and Gary M. Segura (1998). "War, Casualties, and Public Opinion." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 42(3): 278-300.
- Scott Sigmund Gartner and Gary M. Segura (2000). "Race, Opinion, and Casualties in the Vietnam War." *Journal of Politics*. 62(1): 115-146.
- Kurt Taylor Gaubatz (1991). "Election Cycles and War." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 35(2): 212-244.
- Christopher Gelpi (1997). "Democratic Diversions: Governmental Structure and the Externalization of Domestic Conflict." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 41(2): 255-282.
- Christopher Gelpi and Peter D. Feaver (2002). "Speak Softly and Carry a Big Stick? Veterans in the Political Elite and the American Use of Force." *American Political Science Review* 96/4 (December): 779-793
- Christopher Gelpi and Joseph M. Grieco (2001). "Attracting Trouble: Democracy, Leadership Tenure, and the

Targeting of Militarized Challenges, 1918-1992." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 45(6): 794-817.

- Alexandra Guisinger and Alastair Smith (2002). "Honest Threats: The Interaction of Reputation and Political Institutions in the International Crises." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46/2 (April): 175-200
- Joe D. Hagan (1986). "Domestic Political Conflict, Issue Areas, and Some Dimensions of Foreign Policy Behavior Other Than Conflict." *International Interactions*, 12: 291-313.
- Joe D. Hagan (1994). "Domestic Political Systems and War Proneness." *Mershon International Studies Review* 38, 2: 183-207.
- Patrick James and John R. Oneal (1991). "Influences on the President's Use of Force." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 35(2): 307-332.
- Brian Lai and Dan Reiter (2005). "Rally 'Round the Union Jack? Public Opinion and the Use of Force in the United Kingdom, 1948-2001." *International Studies Quarterly* 49 (2): 255-272.
- Brett Ashley Leeds and David Davis (1997). "Domestic Political Vulnerability and International Disputes." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 41, 6: 814-834.
- Jack S. Levy (1989). "The Diversionary Theory of War: A Critique." In Manus Midlarsky, ed., *Handbook of War Studies*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 259-288.
- Jack S. Levy (1988). "Domestic Politics and War." *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, 18: 653-73.
- Bradley Lian and John R. Oneal (1993). "Presidents, the Use of Military Force, and Public Opinion." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 37(2): 277-300.
- James Meernik (1994). "Presidential Decision Making and the Political Use of Military Force." *International Studies Quarterly*, 38(1): 121-138.
- James Meernik and Peter Waterman (1996). "The Myth of the Diversionary Use of Force by American Presidents." *Political Research Quarterly* 49, 3: 573-590.
- Miller, Ross A. (1995). "Domestic Structures and the Diversionary Use of Force." *American Journal of Political Science*, 39: 760-785.
- Ross A. Miller (1999). "Regime Type, Strategic Interaction, and the Diversionary Use of Force." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 43(3): 388-402.
- Sara McLaughlin Mitchell and Will H. Moore (2002). "Presidential Use of Force During the Cold War: Aggregation, Truncation, and Temporal Dynamics." *American Journal of Political Science* 46, 2 (April).
- T. Clifton Morgan and Christopher J. Anderson (1999). "Domestic Support and Diversionary External Conflict in Great Britain, 1950-1992." *Journal of Politics*, 61(3): 799-814.
- T. Clifton Morgan and Kenneth N. Bickers (1992). "Domestic Discontent and the External Use of Force." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 36:25-52.
- John R. Oneal, Brad Lian, and James H. Joyner, Jr. (1996). "Are the American People 'Pretty Prudent'? Public Responses to U.S. Uses of Force, 1950-1988." *International Studies Quarterly*, 40(2): 261-280.
- John R. Oneal and Jaroslav Tir (2006). "Does the Diversionary Use of Force Threaten the Democratic Peace? Assessing the Effect of Economic Growth on Interstate Conflict, 1921-2001." *International Studies Quarterly* 50 (4): 755-779.
- Charles W. Ostrom, Jr., and Brian L. Job (1986). "The President and the Political Use of Force." *American Political Science Review* 80, 2: 541-566.
- Peter J. Partell and Glenn Palmer (1999). "Audience Costs and Interstate Crises: An Empirical Assessment of Fearon's Model of Dispute Outcomes." *International Studies Quarterly*, 43(2): 389-405.
- Philip B. K. Potter (2007). "Does Experience Matter?: American Presidential Experience, Age, and International Conflict." *Journal Of Conflict Resolution* 51, 3: 351-378.
- Brandon C. Prins (2003). "Institutional Instability and the Credibility of Audience Costs: Political Participation and Interstate Crisis Bargaining, 1816-1992." *Journal of Peace Research* 40, 1 (January): 67-84
- Diana Richards, T. Clifton Morgan, Rick K. Wilson, Valerie L. Schwebach, and Garry D. Young (1993). "Good Times, Bad Times, and the Diversionary Use of Force: A Tale of Some Not-So-Free Agents." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 37(3): 504-535.
- Bruce M. Russett (1988). "Economic Decline, Electoral Pressure, and the Initiation of Interstate Conflict," in Charles Gochman and Alan N. Sabrosky (eds.), *Prisoners of War? Nation-States in the Modern Era*. Lexington: D.C. Heath.
- Robert Y. Shapiro and Benjamin I. Paige (1988). "Foreign Policy and the Rational Public." *Journal of Conflict*

Resolution 32: 211-247.

- Alastair Smith (1996). "Diversionary Foreign Policy in Democratic Systems." *International Studies Quarterly*, 40: 133-153.
- Alastair Smith (1998). "International Crises and Domestic Politics." *American Political Science Review* 92/3 (September): 623- 638
- Harvey Starr (1994). "Revolution and War: Rethinking the Linkage Between Internal and External Conflict." *Political Research Quarterly*, 47, 3): 481-507.
- Allan Stam (1996). *Win, Lose, or Draw: Domestic Politics and the Crucible of War*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Richard J. Stoll (1984). "The Guns of November: Presidential Reelections and the Use of Force, 1947-1982." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 28, 2 (June): 231-246.

13. Thursday, April 13: Geography and Issues

Note that the research paper first drafts are due today

Another development in the last decade or so has been the emergence of work on geography and issues as influences on conflict behavior. Several of the review chapters discuss earlier literature on contiguity or proximity and conflict. The remaining readings for this week emphasize territorial or maritime issues as sources of conflict behavior, making the argument that the most important impact of geography lies in the specific issues over which states contend rather than in the simple geographic location of states. Much of the early literature on issues is described in my chapter in the *Oxford Research Encyclopedia*.

Of the more substantive readings, the Hensel & Goemans chapter includes some basic analyses of the differences between militarized disputes over territorial and other issues, and Hensel et al. examine differences in the militarized and peaceful management of territorial, river, and maritime issues. Huth et al. examine the peaceful settlement of territorial issues, Owsiak examines the impact of settling borders on conflict, and Altman investigates the supposed territorial integrity norm that has developed over the past century or two. Beyond territory, Mitchell and Yang discuss "water wars," and Mitchell examines the origins, escalation, and ending of maritime claims.

Note that much more detail on issues is available on my Contexts and IR syllabus, which is available on my web site. That syllabus spends a full week each on territorial issues and other types of contentious issues plus several other weeks on the various impacts of geography on conflict and cooperation, so there are many more items in the additional readings section.

Required Readings:

Reviews:

- *What Do We Know About War*, 3rd edition: chapters by Hensel and Goemans (territory), Mitchell and Yang (water wars)
- Paul R. Hensel (2017). "Territory and Contentious Issues." *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*.

Original Research:

- Paul R. Hensel, Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, Thomas E. Sowers II, and Clayton L. Thyne (2008). "Bones of Contention: Comparing Territorial, Maritime, and River Issues." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52, 1 (February): 117-143.
- Paul K. Huth, Sarah E. Croco, and Benjamin Appel (2011). "Does International Law Promote the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes? Evidence from the Study of Territorial Conflicts since 1945." *American Political Science Review* 105, 2: 415-436.
- Andrew P. Owsiak (2012). "Signing Up for Peace: International Boundary Agreements, Democracy, and Militarized Interstate Conflict." *International Studies Quarterly* 56, 1 (March): 51-66.
- Dan Altman (2020). "The Evolution of Territorial Conquest after 1945 and the Limits of the Territorial Integrity Norm," *International Organization* 74, 3: 490-522.
- Sara McLaughlin Mitchell (2020). "Clashes at Sea: Explaining the Onset, Militarization, and Resolution of Diplomatic Maritime Claims." *Security Studies* 29, 4: 637-670.

Optional Readings:

- *Guide to SSIP*: chapter by Tir and Vasquez (territory)

Additional Readings:

Geography and Conflict

- Luc Anselin and John O'Loughlin (1992). "Geography of International Conflict and Cooperation: Spatial Dependence and Regional Context in Africa." In Michael Don Ward, ed., *The New Geopolitics*. Philadelphia: Gordon and Breach, pp. 39-75.
- Paul F. Diehl (1985). "Contiguity and Escalation in Major Power Rivalries, 1816-1980." *Journal of Politics* 47, 4 (November): 1203-1211.
- Paul F. Diehl (1991), "Geography and War: A Review and Assessment of the Empirical Literature." *International Interactions* 17, 1: 11-27.
- Paul F. Diehl (1992). "What are they Fighting for? The Importance of Issues in International Conflict Research." *Journal of Peace Research* 29(3): 333-344.
- Paul F. Diehl and Nils Petter Gleditsch, eds. (2001). *Environmental Conflict*. New York: Westview Press.
- Kristian S. Gleditsch (2002). *All International Politics is Local: The Diffusion of Conflict, Integration, and Democratization*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Kristian S. Gleditsch and Michael D. Ward (2000). "War and Peace in Space and Time: The Role of Democratization." *International Studies Quarterly* 44:1-29
- Paul R. Hensel (1996). "Charting a Course to Conflict: Territorial Issues and Interstate Conflict, 1816-1992." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 15, 1 (Fall): 43-73.
- Thomas Homer-Dixon and Jessica Blitt, eds. (1998), *Ecoviolence: Links Among Environment, Population, and Security*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Thomas Homer-Dixon (1999). *Environment, Scarcity, and Violence*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Benjamin Most and Harvey Starr (1980). "Diffusion, Reinforcement, Geopolitics, and the Spread of War." *American Political Science Review* 74, 4 (December): 932-946.
- Benjamin Most, Harvey Starr, and Randolph Siverson (1988). "The Logic and Study of the Diffusion of International Conflict." In Manus Midlarsky, ed., *Handbook of War Studies*. Boston: Unwin Hyman, pp. 111-139.
- John O'Loughlin, Michael D. Ward, Corey L. Lofdahl, Jordin S. Cohen, David S. Brown, David Reilly, Kristian S., Gleditsch, and Michael Shin. (1998). "The Diffusion of Democracy, 1946-1994." *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 88, 4: 545-574.
- Randolph M. Siverson and Harvey Starr (1991). *The Diffusion of War: A Study of Opportunity and Willingness*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
- Randolph M. Siverson and Harvey Starr (1990), "Opportunity, Willingness, and the Diffusion of War." *American Political Science Review* 84, 1: 47-67.
- Harvey Starr and Benjamin Most (1978). "A Return Journey: Richardson, Frontiers, and War in the 1945-1965 Era." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 22, 3 (September): 441-462.
- Harvey Starr and Benjamin Most (1983). "Contagion and Border Effects on Contemporary African Conflicts." *Comparative Political Studies* 16, 1 (April): 206-229.
- Harvey Starr and Benjamin Most (1985). "The Forms and Processes of War Diffusion: Research Update on Contagion in African Conflict." *Comparative Political Studies* 18, 2 (July): 206-229.
- Harvey Starr and G. Dale Thomas (2002). "The 'Nature' of Contiguous Borders: Ease of Interaction, Salience, and the Analysis of Crisis." *International Interactions* 28: 213-235.
- Michael D. Ward and Kristian S. Gleditsch (2002). "Location, Location, Location: An MCMC Approach to Modeling the Spatial Context of War and Peace." *Political Analysis* 10: 244-60.

Territorial Issues

- Scott F. Abramson and David B. Carter (2017). "The Historical Origins of Territorial Disputes." *American Political Science Review* 111.
- Todd L. Allee and Paul K. Huth (2006). "The Pursuit of Legal Settlements to Territorial Disputes." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 23, 4 (December): 285-307.

- Boaz Atzili (2006). "When Good Fences Make Bad Neighbors: Fixed Borders, State Weakness, and International Conflict." *International Security* 31: 139-173.
- Paul F. Diehl, ed. (1999). *A Road Map to War: Territorial Dimensions of International Conflict*. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press.
- Paul F. Diehl and Gary Goertz (1988). "Territorial Changes and Militarized Conflict." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 32, 1 (March): 103-122.
- Daniel J. Dzurek (2005). "What Makes Territory Important: Tangible and Intangible Dimensions." *GeoJournal* 64: 263-274.
- Stephen E. Gent and Megan Shannon (2014). "Bargaining Power and the Arbitration and Adjudication of Territorial Claims." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 31, 3 (July): 303-322.
- Douglas M. Gibler (1997). "Control the Issues, Control the Conflict: Resolving Territorial Issues Through Alliances, 1815-1980." *International Interactions* 22, 4.
- Douglas M. Gibler (2007). "Bordering on Peace: Democracy, Territorial Issues, and Conflict." *International Studies Quarterly* 51: 509-532.
- Douglas M. Gibler and Marc L. Hutchison (2013). "Territorial Issues, Audience Costs, and the Democratic Peace: The Importance of Issue Salience." *Journal of Politics* 75, 4 (October): 879-893.
- Stacie E. Goddard (2006). "Uncommon Ground: Indivisible Territory and the Politics of Legitimacy." *International Organization* 60, 1 (Winter): 35-68.
- Hein E. Goemans and David B. Carter (2014). "The Temporal Dynamics of New International Borders." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 31: 285-302.
- Hein E. Goemans and Kenneth Schultz (2017). "The Politics of Territorial Claims: A Geospatial Approach Applied to Africa." *International Organization* 71(1): 31-64.
- Gary Goertz and Paul F. Diehl (1992). *Territorial Changes and International Conflict*. New York: Routledge.
- Gary Goertz and Paul F. Diehl (1990). "Territorial Changes and Recurring Conflict." In Charles S. Gochman and Alan Ned Sabrosky, eds., *Prisoners of War? Nation-States in the Modern Era*. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, pp. 57-72.
- Ron E. Hassner (2003). "To Halve and to Hold: Conflicts over Sacred Space and the Problems of Indivisibility." *Security Studies* 12: 35-68.
- Paul R. Hensel, Michael Allison, and Ahmed Khanani (2009). "Territorial Integrity Treaties and Armed Conflict over Territory." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 26, 2 (April): 120-143.
- Paul R. Hensel and Sara McLaughlin Mitchell (2005). "Issue Indivisibility and Territorial Claims." *GeoJournal* 64, 4 (December): 275-285.
- Kalevi J. Holsti (1990). *Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order, 1648-1989*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Paul K. Huth (1996). *Standing Your Ground: Territorial Disputes and International Conflict*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Paul K. Huth and Todd Allee (2002). *The Democratic Peace and Territorial Conflict in the Twentieth Century*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Paul K. Huth and Todd L. Allee (2002). "Domestic Political Accountability and the Escalation and Settlement of International Disputes." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46/6 (December): 754-790.
- Paul K. Huth, Sarah E. Croco, and Benjamin Appel (2012). "Law and the Use of Force in World Politics: The Varied Effects of Law on the Exercise of Military Power in Territorial Disputes." *International Studies Quarterly* 56, 1: 17-31.
- Arie M. Kacowicz (1994). *Peaceful Territorial Change*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
- Stephen Kocs (1995). "Territorial Disputes and Interstate War, 1945-1987." *Journal of Politics* 57, 1: 159-175.
- Robert Mandel (1980). "Roots of the Modern Interstate Border Dispute." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 24, 3: 427-454.
- Sara McLaughlin Mitchell and Paul R. Hensel (2007). "International Institutions and Compliance with Agreements over Contentious Issues." *American Journal of Political Science* 51, 4 (October): 721-737.
- David Newman (1999). "Real Places, Symbolic Spaces: Interrelated Notions of Territory in the Arab-Israeli Conflict." In Paul F. Diehl, ed., *A Road Map to War*. Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, pp. 3-34.
- Alyssa K. Prorok and Paul K. Huth (2015). "International Law and the Consolidation of Peace Following

Territorial Changes.” *Journal of Politics* 77, 1: 161-174.

- Paul D. Senese (1996). “Geographical Proximity and Issue Salience: Their Effects on the Escalation of Militarized Interstate Conflict.” *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 15, 1 (Fall 1996): 133-161.
- Paul D. Senese and John A. Vasquez (2003). “A Unified Explanation of Territorial Conflict: Testing the Impact of Sampling Bias, 1919-1992.” *International Studies Quarterly* 47, 2 (June): 275-298.
- Megan Shannon (2009). “Preventing War and Providing the Peace?: International Organizations and the Management of Territorial Disputes.” *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 26: 144-163.
- Nadav G. Shelef (2016). “Unequal Ground: Homelands and Conflict.” *International Organization*.
- Beth A. Simmons (1999). “See You in ‘Court’?: The Appeal to Quasi-Judicial Legal Processes in the Settlement of Territorial Disputes.” In Paul F. Diehl, ed., *A Road Map to War*. Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, pp. 205-237.
- Beth A. Simmons (2002). “Capacity, Commitment, and Compliance: International Institutions and Territorial Disputes.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46, 6 (December): 829-856.
- Harvey Starr and G. Dale Thomas (2005). “The Nature of Borders and International Conflict: Revisiting Hypotheses on Territory.” *International Studies Quarterly* 49(1): 123-140.
- Jaroslav Tir (2003). “Never-Ending Conflicts? Territorial Changes as Potential Solutions for Territorial Disputes.” *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 20: 59-84.
- Jaroslav Tir (2003). “Averting Armed International Conflicts Through State-to-State Territorial Transfers.” *Journal of Politics* 65: 1235-1257.
- Jaroslav Tir (2005). “Keeping the Peace After Secessions: Territorial Conflict Between Rump and Secessionist States.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49: 713-741.
- Jaroslav Tir (2006). *Redrawing the Map to Promote Peace*. New York: Lexington Books.
- Jaroslav Tir (2010). “Territorial Diversion: Diversionary Theory of War and Territorial Conflict.” *Journal of Politics* 72, 2: 413-425.
- Monica Duffy Toft (2003). *The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity, Interests, and the Indivisibility of Territory*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Monica Duffy Toft (2014). “Territory and War.” *Journal of Peace Research* 51, 2 (March): 185-198.
- John A. Vasquez (1993). *The War Puzzle*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- John A. Vasquez (1995). “Why Do Neighbors Fight? Proximity, Interaction, or Territoriality.” *Journal of Peace Research* 32, 3: 277-293.
- John A. Vasquez and Marie T. Henehan (2001). “Territorial Disputes and the Probability of War, 1816-1992.” *Journal of Peace Research* 38, 2: 123-138.
- Thorin N. Wright and Paul F. Diehl (2016). “Unpacking Territorial Disputes: Domestic Political Influences and War.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 60, 4: 645-669.

River Issues:

- Thomas Bernauer (2002). “Explaining Success and Failure in International River Management.” *Aquatic Sciences* 64, 1: 1-19.
- Marit Brochmann and Nils Petter Gleditsch (2012). “Shared Rivers and Conflict: A Reconsideration.” *Political Geography* 31, 8 (November): 519-527.
- Ken Conca (2006). *Governing Water: Contentious Transnational Politics and Global Institution Building*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Mark F. Giordano, Meredith A. Giordano, and Aaron T. Wolf (2005). “International Resource Conflict and Mitigation.” *Journal of Peace Research* 42, 1: 47-65.
- Nils Petter Gleditsch, Kathryn Furlong, Håvard Hegre, Bethany Lacina, and Taylor Owen (2006). “Conflicts over shared rivers: Resource scarcity or fuzzy boundaries?” *Political Geography* 25, 4 (May): 361-382.
- Peter H. Gleick (1993). “Water and Conflict: Fresh Water Resources and International Security.” *International Security* 18, 1 (Summer): 79-112.
- Sara McLaughlin Mitchell and Neda Zawahri (2015). “The Effectiveness of Treaty Design in Addressing Water Disputes.” *Journal of Peace Research* 52, 2 (February): 187-200.
- Jaroslav Tir and Douglas M. Stinnett (2012). “Weathering Climate Change: Can Institutions Mitigate International Water Conflict?” *Journal of Peace Research* 49, 1 (January): 211-225.

- Hans Petter Wollebaek Tøset, Nils Petter Gleditsch, and Havard Hegre (2000). "Shared Rivers and Interstate Conflict." *Political Geography* 19: 971-996.
- Aaron T. Wolf (1998). "Conflict and Cooperation along International Waterways." *Water Policy* 1, 2: 251-265.

Maritime Issues:

- Aslaug Asgeirsdóttir (2007). "Oceans of Trouble: Domestic Influence on International Fisheries Cooperation in the North Atlantic and Barents Sea." *Global Environmental Politics* 7, 1: 120-144.
- Áslaug Ásgeirsdóttir and Martin Steinwand (2015). "Dispute settlement mechanisms and maritime boundary settlements." *Review of International Organizations* 10: 119-143.
- Jennifer Bailey (1996). "Hot Fish and Bargaining Chips." *Journal of Peace Research* 33: 257-262.
- Cullen S Hendrix and Sarah M Glaser (2011). "Civil conflict and world fisheries, 1952–2004." *Journal of Peace Research* 48, 4 (July): 481-495.
- Sara McLaughlin Mitchell and Brandon C. Prins (1999). "Beyond Territorial Contiguity: Issues at Stake in Democratic Militarized Interstate Disputes." *International Studies Quarterly* 43:169-183.
- Elizabeth Nyman (2015). "Offshore oil development and maritime conflict in the 20th century: A statistical analysis of international trends." *Energy Research and Social Science* 6: 1-7.

14. Thursday, April 20: Conflict Consequences and Aftermath

*****Note that the reviews of your colleagues' research papers are due today*****

Having spent most of the semester looking at causes of conflict behavior, we will now spend a week on its consequences. This includes consequences for political leaders (Croco and Weeks) and demographic and economic impacts (Kugler et al.), as well as longer-term consequences such as future conflict patterns (Garnham on war weariness and the three What Do We Know About War chapters on rivalry, conflict outcomes, and transitions to peace).

Note that much more detail on recurrent conflict, rivalry, and other consequences of conflict is available on my Contexts and IR syllabus, which is available on my web site. That syllabus spends two entire weeks on the problem of rivalry and recurrent conflict plus another on the various impacts of crises and wars, so there are many more items in the additional readings section.

Also note that Michael Greig regularly teaches a seminar on conflict management that addresses the role of mediators or other outside parties in the settlement or management of conflict, so I have not covered that material in this course.

Required Readings:

Reviews:

- *What Do We Know About War*, 3rd edition: chapters by Akcinaroglu and Radziscewski (rivalry), Quacekbush (outcomes and consequences of war), Owsiak et al. (transitions to peace)

Original Research:

- David Garnham (1986). "War-proneness, War-Weariness and Regime Type, 1816-1980." *Journal of Peace Research* 23, 3: 279-285.
- Tadeusz Kugler, Kyung Kook Kang, Jacek Kugler, Marina Arbetman-Rabinowitz, and John Thomas (2012). "Demographic and Economic Consequences of Conflict." *International Studies Quarterly* 57, 1: 1-12.
- Sarah E. Croco and Jessica L. P. Weeks (2016). "War Outcomes and Leader Tenure." *World Politics* 68, 4 (October): 577-607.

Optional Readings:

- *Guide to SSIP*: chapters by Prorok and Huth (consequences of war), Hartzell and Yuen (duration of peace)

Additional Readings:

Conflict Outcomes

- Ivan Arreguin-Toft (2001). "How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict" *International Security*, 26, 1: 93-128.

- D. Scott Bennett and Allan C. Stam III (1998). "The Declining Advantages of Democracy: A Combined Model of War Outcomes and Duration." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42, 3: 344-366.
- Cynthia A. Cannizzo (1980). "The Costs of Combat: Death, Duration and Defeat." In J. David Singer, ed., *The Correlates of War II*. New York: Free Press, pp. 233-57
- Michael Desch (2002). "Democracy and Victory: Why Regime Type Hardly Matters" *International Security* 27, 2: 5-47.
- Scott Sigmund Gartner and Randolph M. Siverson (1996). "War Expansion and War Outcome." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 40(1): 4-15.
- Erik Gartzke (2001). "Democracy and the Preparation for War: Does Regime Type Affect States' Anticipation of Casualties?" *International Studies Quarterly*, 45(3): 467-484.
- Christopher F. Gelpi and Michael Griesdorf (2001). "Winners or Losers? Democracies in International Crisis, 1918-94." *American Political Science Review*, 95(3): 633-647.
- David A. Lake (1992). "Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War." *American Political Science Review*, 86: 24-37.
- Zeev Maoz (1983). "Resolve, Capabilities, and the Outcomes of International Disputes." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 27, 2: 195-230.
- Zeev Maoz (1989). "Power, Capabilities, and Paradoxical Conflict Outcomes." *World Politics* 41, 2: 239-266.
- Daniel S. Morey (2016). "Military Coalitions and the Outcome of Interstate Wars." *Foreign Policy Analysis* 12, 4: 533-551.
- William Reed and David Clark (2000). "War Initiators and War Winners: The Consequences of Linking Theories of Democratic War Success." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 44, 3: 378-395.
- Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam III (1998). "Democracy, War Initiation, and Victory." *American Political Science Review*, 92(2): 377-389.
- Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam III (1998). "Democracy and Battlefield Military Effectiveness." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 42(3): 259-277.
- Steven Rosen (1972). "War Power and the Willingness to Suffer." In Bruce Russett (ed.), *Peace, War and Numbers*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 167-335
- Kevin Wang and James Lee Ray (1994). "Beginners and Winners: the Fate of Initiators of Interstate Wars Involving Great Powers Since 1495." *International Studies Quarterly*, 38(1): 139-154.
- Frank W. Wayman, J. David Singer, and Gary Goertz (1983). "Capabilities, Allocations, and Success in Militarized Disputes and Wars, 1816-1976." *International Studies Quarterly* 27:497-515.

Conflict Duration / Termination

- D. Scott Bennett and Allan Stam (1996). "The Duration of Interstate Wars, 1816-1985." *American Political Science Review*, 90, 2: 239-257.
- Claudio Cioffi-Revilla (1991). "On the Likely Magnitude, Extent, and Duration of an Iraqi-UN War." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 35, 3: 387-411.
- Scott Sigmund Gartner and Randolph M. Siverson (1996). "War Expansion and War Outcome." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 40(1): 4-15.
- Hein E. Goemans (2000). "Fighting for Survival: The Fate of Leaders and the Duration of War." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 44, 5: 555-579.
- Hein E. Goemans (2000). *War and Punishment: The Causes of War Termination and the First World War*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Fred Charles Iklé (1971). *Every War Must End*. New York: Columbia.
- Tansa George Massoud (1996). "War Termination." *Journal of Peace Research*, 33, 4: 491-496.
- Christopher R. Mitchell and Nicholson, Michael (1983). "Rational Models and the Ending of Wars." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 27:495-520.
- Suzanne Werner (1998). "Negotiating the Terms of Settlement: War Aims and Bargaining Leverage." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 42(3): 321-343.

Other Conflict Consequences

- Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Randolph M. Siverson, and Gary Woller (1992). "War and the Fate of Regimes: A

Comparative Analysis." *American Political Science Review*, 86: 638-646.

- Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Randolph M. Siverson (1995). "War and the Survival of Political Leaders: A Comparative Study of Regime Types and Political Accountability." *American Political Science Review* 89: 841-853.
- Hein E. Goemans (2008). "Which Way Out? The Manner and Consequences of Losing Office." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52, 6: 771-794.
- Jacek Kugler and Marina Arbetman (1989). "Exploring the 'Phoenix Factor' with the Collective Goods Perspective." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 33(1): 84-112.
- A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler (1977). "The Costs of Major Wars: The Phoenix Factor." *American Political Science Review* (December): 71, 4.
- Karen Rasler and Thompson, William R. (1988). "War and the Economic Growth of Major Powers." *American Journal of Political Science* 513-538.
- Karen Rasler and William Thompson (1989). *War and State Making: The Shaping of the Global Powers*. Boston: Unwin-Hyman.
- Karen Rasler and William Thompson (1992). "Assessing the Costs of War: A Preliminary Cut." in Giorgio Ausenda (ed.), *Effects of War on Society*. San Marino: AIEP Editore: 245-279.
- Arthur A. Stein and Bruce Russett (1980), "Evaluating War: Outcomes and Consequences." In T. R. Gurr, ed., *Handbook of Political Conflict*. New York: Free Press, pp. 399-422.
- William R. Thompson (1994). "The Consequences of War." *International Interactions* 19, 1-2: 125-147
- Dirk Van Raemdonck and Paul F. Diehl (1989). "After the Shooting Stops: Insights on Postwar Economic Growth." *Journal of Peace Research* 26, 3: 249-264.

Recurrent Conflict

- Mark J. C. Crescenzi and Andrew J. Enterline (2001). "Time Remembered: A Dynamic Model of Interstate Interaction." *International Studies Quarterly*, 45(3): 409-431.
- Mark J. C. Crescenzi (2007). "Reputation and Interstate Conflict." *American Journal of Political Science* 51 (2): 382-396.
- David Garnham (1986). "War-proneness, War-Weariness and Regime Type, 1816-1980." *Journal of Peace Research* 23, 3: 279-285.
- Joseph Grieco (2001). "Repetitive Military Challenges and Recurrent International Conflicts, 1918-1994." *International Studies Quarterly* 45, 2: 295-316.
- Paul R. Hensel (1994), "One Thing Leads to Another: Recurrent Militarized Disputes in Latin America, 1816-1986." *Journal of Peace Research* 31, 3 (August): 281-298.
- Russell J. Leng (1983), "When Will They Ever Learn? Coercive Bargaining in Recurrent Crises." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 27, 3 (September): 379-419.
- Russell J. Leng (2000). *Bargaining and Learning in Recurrent Crises: The Soviet-American, Egyptian-Israeli, and Indo-Pakistani Rivalries*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Jack S. Levy and T. Clifton Morgan (1986). "The War-Weariness Hypothesis: An Empirical Test." *American Journal of Political Science* 30, 1: 26-49.
- Zeev Maoz (1984). "Peace by Empire? Conflict Outcomes and International Stability, 1816-1976." *Journal of Peace Research* 21, 3: 227-241.
- T. Clifton Morgan and Jack S. Levy (1990). "Base Stealers versus Power Hitters: A Nation-State Level Analysis of the Frequency and Seriousness of War." In Charles S. Gochman and Alan Ned Sabrosky (eds.), *Prisoners of War? Nation-States in the Modern Era*. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, pp. 43-56.
- Jeffrey Pickering (2002). "War-Weariness and Cumulative Effects: Victors, Vanquished, and Subsequent Interstate Intervention." *Journal of Peace Research* 39/3 (May): 313-337
- Richard J. Stoll (1984). "From Fire to Frying Pan: The Impact of Major-Power War Involvement on Major-Power Dispute Involvement, 1816-1975." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 7, 2: 71-82.
- Suzanne Werner (1999). "The Precarious Nature of Peace: Resolving the Issues, Enforcing the Settlement, and Renegotiating the Terms." *American Journal of Political Science* 43, 3: 912-934.
- Scott Wolford (2017). "The Problem of Shared Victory: War-winning Coalitions and Postwar Peace." *Journal of Politics* 79, 2: 702-716.

Interstate Rivalry

- John Vasquez, ed. (2000), *What Do We Know About War? (1st edition)*: chapters by Goertz & Diehl and Wayman (rivalries)
- D. Scott Bennett (1996). "Security, Bargaining, and the End of Interstate Rivalry." *International Studies Quarterly* 40, 2: 157-183.
- D. Scott Bennett (1997). "Democracy, Regime Change, and Rivalry Termination." *International Interactions*, 22(4): 369-397.
- D. Scott Bennett (1998). "Integrating and Testing Models of Rivalry Termination." *American Journal of Political Science* 42: 1200-1232.
- Jacob Bercovitch and Paul F. Diehl (1997). "Conflict Management of Enduring Rivalries: The Frequency, Timing, and Short-term Impact of Mediation." *International Interactions*, 22(4): 299-320.
- Michael Colaresi and William R. Thompson (2002). "Strategic Rivalries, Protracted Conflict, and Crisis Escalation." *Journal of Peace Research* 39/3 (May): 263-287
- Paul F. Diehl, ed. (1996). *The Dynamics of Enduring Rivalries*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Paul F. Diehl and Gary Goertz (2000). *War and Peace in International Rivalry*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Erik Gartzke and Michael Simon (1999). "'Hot Hand': A Critical Analysis of Enduring Rivalries." *Journal of Politics* 61, 3 (August): 777-798.
- Gary Goertz and Paul F. Diehl (1992). "The Empirical Importance of Enduring Rivalries." *International Interactions*, 18(2): 151-163.
- Gary Goertz and Paul F. Diehl (1993). "Enduring Rivalries: Theoretical Constructs and Empirical Patterns." *International Studies Quarterly*, 37(2): 147-171.
- Gary Goertz and Paul F. Diehl (1995). "The Initiation and Termination of Enduring Rivalries: The Impact of Political Shocks." *American Journal of Political Science*, 39(1): 30-52.
- Gary Goertz and Paul F. Diehl (2000). "(Enduring) Rivalries." In Manus I. Midlarsky ed., *Handbook of War Studies II*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, p. 222-270.
- Gary Goertz and Patrick M. Regan (1997). "Conflict Management and Enduring Rivalries." *International Interactions*, 22(4): 321-330.
- Paul R. Hensel (1999). "An Evolutionary Approach to the Study of Interstate Rivalry." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 17, 2 (Fall): 179-206.
- Paul R. Hensel (2001). "Evolution in Domestic Politics and the Development of Rivalry: The Bolivia-Paraguay Case." In William R. Thompson, ed., *Evolutionary Interpretations of World Politics*. New York: Routledge, pp. 176-217.
- Paul R. Hensel, Gary Goertz, and Paul F. Diehl (2000). "The Democratic Peace and Rivalries." *Journal of Politics* 62, 4 (November): 1173-1188.
- James P. Klein, Gary Goertz, and Paul F. Diehl (2006). "The New Rivalry Dataset: Procedures and Patterns." *Journal of Peace Research* 43, 3: 331-348/
- Douglas Lemke and William Reed (2001). "War and Rivalry among Great Powers." *American Journal of Political Science* 45/2 (April): 457-469
- Zeev Maoz and Ben D. Mor (1996), "Enduring Rivalries: The Early Years." *International Political Science Review* 17, 2: 141-160.
- Zeev Maoz and Ben D. Mor (2002). *Bound by Struggle: The Strategic Evolution of Enduring International Rivalries*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Karen Rasler and William R. Thompson (2000). "Explaining Rivalry Escalation to War: Space, Position, and Contiguity in the Major Power Subsystem." *International Studies Quarterly* 44, 3: 503-530.
- Karen Rasler and William R. Thompson (2001). "Rivalries and the Democratic Peace in the Major Power Subsystem." *Journal of Peace Research* 38/6 (November): 659-683.
- William R. Thompson (1994). "Principal Rivalries." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 39: 195-223.
- William R. Thompson (1998). *Great Power Rivalries*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
- William R. Thompson (2001). "Identifying Rivals and Rivalries in World Politics." *International Studies*

Quarterly 45, 4: 557-586.

- William R. Thompson (2003). "A Street Car Named Sarajevo: Catalysts, Multiple Causation Chains, and Rivalry Structures." *International Studies Quarterly* 47/3 (September): 453-474.
- Brandon Valeriano and Matthew Powers (2016). "Complex Interstate Rivals." *Foreign Policy Analysis* 12: 552-570.
- John A. Vasquez (1996). "Distinguishing Rivals That Go to War from Those That Do Not: A Quantitative Comparative Case Study of the Two Paths to War." *International Studies Quarterly* 40: 531-558.

15. Thursday, April 27: Wrapup: Global Applicability?

In this final substantive meeting of the semester, we will try to wrap up the semester and set the stage for future research. This wrapup will begin by considering the global applicability of research on armed conflict. Most of our theories have been designed and tested as general theories that should (in principle) be relevant across time and space. Yet there is reason to believe that many of these theories may not be very appropriate for many countries or types of countries (and may be inappropriate for entire regions of the world). Or in the words of Most and Starr, we may need "nice" laws rather than general, universal theories that explain all of time and space. Thinking back through all that we have covered this semester, how useful is the idea of pursuing globally applicable theories, and how confident are you that the major findings we have discussed would hold up under regional, temporal, or other sub-analyses rather than focusing on the great powers or the entire international system?

Also consider the conclusions and suggestions of Wallensteen, Maoz, and Levy from the Vasquez book. Do they seem to have summarized the existing literature well? Do they seem to offer useful suggestions for future research? Which other directions would you like to see future research go in trying to understand the causes and consequences of interstate conflict?

Required Readings:

- Benjamin A. Most and Harvey Starr (1984). "International Relations Theory, Foreign Policy Substitutability, and "Nice" Laws." *World Politics* 36, 3 (April): 383-406.
- *What Do We Know About War*, 3rd edition: chapters by Thompson, Owsiak and Atkinson, Mitchell and Vasquez (conclusions/future directions)

Additional Readings:

Some Methodological or Research Design Issues in Studying Conflict

- Special Issue of *Conflict Management and Peace Science* on model specification and control variables, Winter 2005.
- Special feature in *International Studies Quarterly* on the promise and pitfalls of dyadic research designs in international studies, June 2016.
- Nathaniel Beck, Gary King, and Langche Zeng (2000). "Improving Quantitative Studies of International Conflict: A Conjecture." *American Political Science Review*, 94, 1: 21-35.
- D. Scott Bennett and Allan Stam (2000). "Research Design and Estimator Choices in the Analysis of Interstate Dyads: When Decisions Matter." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 44(5): 653-685.
- D. Scott Bennett (2006). "Exploring Operationalizations of Political Relevance." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 23, 3 (September): 245 - 261.
- Michelle A. Benson (2005). "The Relevance of Politically Relevant Dyads in the Study of Interdependence and Dyadic Disputes." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 22, 2 (July): 113-133.
- Bear F. Braumoeller and Gary Goertz (2000). "The Methodology of Necessary Conditions." *American Journal of Political Science*, 44(4): 844-858.
- Bear F. Braumoeller (2004). "Hypothesis Testing and Multiplicative Interaction Terms." *International Organization* 58, 4: 807-820.
- David H. Clark and Timothy Nordstrom (2003). "Risky Influence: Unobserved Treatment Effects in Conflict Studies." *International Studies Quarterly* 47/3 (September): 417-429
- Raymond Dacey (2005). "The Status of Likelihood Claims in International Relations and Peace Science." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 22, 3 (October): 189-200.

- Erik Gartzke (1999). "War is in the Error Term." *International Organization* 53 (summer): 567-587.
- Gary King and Langche Zeng (2001). "Explaining Rare Events in IR." *International Organization* 55 (Summer): 693-716.
- Libby Jenke and Christopher Gelpi (2017). "Theme and Variations: Historical Contingencies in the Causal Model of Interstate Conflict." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 61, 10: 2262-2284.
- Douglas Lemke (2002). *Regions of War and Peace*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Douglas Lemke and William Reed (2001). "The Relevance of Politically Relevant Dyads." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 45, 1: 126-144.
- Benjamin Most and Harvey Starr (1989). *Inquiry, Logic, and International Politics*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
- Curtis S. Signorino and Kuzey Yilmaz (2003). "Strategic Misspecification in Regression Models." *American Journal of Political Science* 47/3 (July): 551-566
- Harvey Starr (2005). "Cumulation from Proper Specification: Theory, Logic, Research Design, and 'Nice' Laws." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 22: 353-363.
- William R. Thompson (2003). "A Street Car Named Sarajevo: Catalysts, Multiple Causation Chains, and Rivalry Structures." *International Studies Quarterly* 47, 3 (September): 453-474

Taking Stock / Lit Reviews

- *Guide to SSIP*: chapter by Kadera and Zinnes (how methods met models)
- John Vasquez, ed. (2000), *What Do We Know About War? (1st edition)*: chapters by Bremer, Levy, Midlarsky, Vasquez
- *Handbook of War Studies* (any of the three volumes)
- Stuart A. Bremer and Thomas R. Cusack, eds. (1995). *The Process of War: Advancing the Scientific Study of War*. Luxembourg: Gordon and Breach.
- Daniel Geller and J. David Singer (1998). *Nations at War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kalevi J. Holsti (1989). "Mirror, Mirror, on the Wall, Which are the Fairest Theories of All?" *International Studies Quarterly*, 33: 255-261.

16. Thursday, May 4: Paper Presentations

*****Note that everyone must present a brief summary of his/her research paper today*****

This final meeting will allow each student to present a brief (5 minute) summary of his/her research paper. Please, no PowerPoints! This meeting may be held in a different location, such as the instructor's house or a local restaurant; the details will be worked out closer to the date in question.

Thursday, May 11: FINAL PAPERS DUE (via TurnItIn, no later than 1:30-3:30 PM)

The final version of your research paper must be turned in through the TurnItIn link on the course's Canvas page no later than the scheduled final exam period for this course. This final version of the paper must include a memo describing the changes that have been made in response to the written reviewers' comments.